

# 解析中国

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En el área iberoamericana, diferentes centros y personas vienen desarrollando desde hace años una ardua labor de seguimiento y análisis de la realidad china. El momento actual parece propicio para activar sinergias que permitan una mayor visibilidad de dicho trabajo, de forma que pueda ponerse en valor esa trayectoria y aflorar un discurso propio en nuestro ámbito político-cultural sobre los cambios en el mundo chino y sus implicaciones regionales y globales.

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# Argentina Facing China: Modernization, Interests and Economic Relations Model

Eduardo Daniel Oviedo

## Introduction

Trade exchange, different economic capacities and positions in the international structure have shaped an asymmetrical relation between Argentina and China. This asymmetrical relation has created an interest network at the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century and this is the subject of study in this article.

The article is structured in three parts. First, it examines the economic capacities, position in the international economic structure and the terms of trade interaction to argue that the core-peripheral scheme predominates in Argentine-Chinese relations. Second, it points out that the Chinese export model and its vast internal market have generated a new economic coalition of interests, called by the Chinese government as *strategic partnership*. In front of this, Argentina and the other Latin American countries have two policy options towards the new Chinese international division of labor: 1) to deploy relations with China according to a core-periphery scheme and adapt their economies to the demands of Chinese international specialization or; 2) to recognize the real economic situation and simultaneously support the *de-primarization*<sup>(1)</sup> of their economies to surpass the core-periphery model. Third, in the context of harmony generated by the Chinese model, it attempts to determine the complementary interests and the collision points as regards the modernizations in Argentina and China. These complementary interests emerge on Argentina's renewable resources, Chinese manufactured goods and Chinese investments in Argentine economic sectors. Simultaneously, opposite interests and tensions appear on non-renewable resources; protectionist measures; rivalry in third markets and other emerging problems that arise when Argentina seeks to develop its process of economic *de-primarization*.

The hypothesis affirms that harmony is more important and predominates over discord in the Argentine-Chinese economic relations. In fact, when the Argentine government accepts the Chinese international division of labor, the complementation of interests with China is feasible and stable; but, when Argentina deepens its process of *de-primarization*, several discord points arise in bilateral trade. The crisis about the crude soybean oil in 2010 is an example that trade could tend to increase tensions, a situation similar to that found in the Chinese-Mexican case, if the Argentine industrialization continues in the coming years. Precisely, the process of policy coordination seeks to solve these discord points in order to maintain a harmonic relation and consolidate bilateral cooperation.

(1) According to Pierre Salama, “[t]here is no scientific definition of ‘primarization’, but we can say that an economy is *primarized* if the exports of primary products dominate their total and it is in process of primarization if this segment tends to increase significantly.” [41] Inversely, we can asseverate the concept of *de-primarization*, when the prevalence of primary products decreases their share in total exports in compared with previous times.

## 1. The Model of Interaction

1972-1999

•Semiperipheral-semiperipheral relation

1999-.....

•Core-peripheral relation

Fig. 1: Historical scheme of Argentina–China economic relation

When we study the Argentine–Chinese economic ties, firstly, we must put in clear the kind of interaction both countries have, especially in trade relation.

In economic terms,<sup>(2)</sup> the semiperipheral-semiperipheral scheme explains the bilateral relation since the moment in which the Argentine government recognized the government of People's Republic of China in 1972 and until China gained access to the *club* of economic core countries in 1999 [35]. Since China became a great economic power and until the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, both countries formed, *ceteris paribus*, an economic core–peripheral relation<sup>(3)</sup> (see Fig. 1). That is, a great economic power (China) and one country that has not yet become a middle power from the economic point of view (Argentina)<sup>(4)</sup> as can be seen in Table 1.

(2) Although the economic factor is not the only element that can be used to estimate national power, this paper will focus exclusively on it for the purposes of the analysis being conducted here, with other factors remaining constant.

(3) The German-Chilean economist Ernest Wagemann has used, for first time, the concept of periphery [1]. The Argentine economist Raul Prebisch introduced the core–periphery term in the international economic field and its study was continued by other Latin-American authors. In the 1970s, Immanuel Wallerstein included the concept of semi-periphery as an intermediate force between the core and peripheral countries. [45].

(4) Argentina clearly is a semiperipheral area in Wallerstein world-system division [45]. But, in this paper, core, semiperipheral and peripheral powers are explained only in economic terms. Argentina increases its power dimensions with addition of political, geographical and social factors, but from an economic point of view, it still remains as a peripheral power. General speaking, it is clear that Argentina is more relevant than Paraguay, Uruguay, Haiti and other small countries, but in economic terms it does not reach the semiperipheral level. In this case, if the G-20 is integrated by the world's major advanced and emerging economies, the Argentine participation in this group is, at least, questionable.

Table 1 World economy stratification<sup>(5)</sup>

Status	Year 2000			Year 2011		
	Countries	GDP	PPP	Countries	GDP	PPP
Greateconomic powers	United States	1	1	United States	1	1
	Japan	2	3	<b>China</b>	2	2
	Germany	3	5	Japan	3	3
	United Kingdom	4	7	Germany	4	5
	France	5	6	France	5	7
	<b>China</b>	6	2	Brazil	6	9
Middle economic powers				United Kingdom	7	8
				Italy	8	10
				Russia	9	6
	Italy	7	8	India	10	4
	Canada	8	11	Canada	11	14
	Brazil	9	9	Spain	12	13
	Spain	10	12	Australia	13	17
	Mexico	11	10	Mexico	14	11
	India	12	4	South Korea	15	12
	South Korea	13	13	Indonesia	16	16
	Netherlands	14	15	Netherlands	17	19
				Turkey	18	15
				Switzerland	19	29
				Arabia	20	21
			Sweden	21	30	

(5) This table shows the stratification of the countries' economies by size, estimated in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) according to World Bank data. Following the Pareto principle, 20 percent of the economic units, for example 36 of 181 countries listed in the 2000 year report, should have the 80 percent of Gross World Product (GWP). But, this 80 percent was exceeded only by 14 units in 2000 and by 21 in 2011. This criterion is important to separate the great and middle economic powers from the small ones, forming the Pareto real line. In turn, if from the 80 percent of total GWP we, again, take out the 80 percent, we can set other line to separate the great powers from the middle powers. In 2000, the 80% of GWP has been reached with 14 countries and the oligopoly of great powers corresponded to 6. So from an economic point of view, although that the global trend in the first decade of twenty-first century has been towards economic force de-concentration, also continues the global economic concentration in a few states, because the number of great and middle powers is so far from the Pareto theoretical line. Despite this trend, comparative data from 2000 and 2011 shows the increase of the number of great and middle powers from 14 to 21, and the oligopoly of great nations from 6 to 9. We can see that the trend towards global economic concentration has been reversed towards the trend of de-concentration, as a result of the contraction of the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Canada economies. But it is important to take into consideration that, due to the rise of China, India and Russia, the great powers *club* undergoes an opening that allows the participation of more nations on it, while simultaneously tending to re-concentrate the world's wealth.

Pareto real line							
Small economic powers	<b>Argentina</b>	15	29		Poland	22	18
	Turkey	16	15		Belgium	23	28
	Russian	17	10		Norway	24	35
	Switzerland	18	26		<b>Argentina</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>20</b>
	Belgium	19	24		Austria	26	36
	Other small economic countries				Othersmall economic countries		
Pareto theoretical line							
	Othersmall economic countries				Othersmall economic countries		

Source: The World Bank, World Development Report 2002 and 2010. [47]

Exclude Taiwan. China includes Hong Kong.

In the same way, Brazil has been a member of the oligopoly of great powers since 2007, Mexico a middle economic power and China remains constant as a great economic power; the linkage between China and Latin American countries can be classified in three different economic models: a core-core scheme describes the Chinese-Brazilian relation; a core-semi-peripheral model explains the Chinese-Mexican relation and a core-peripheral model defines the relation between China and other Latin American countries. Also, in the terms of exchange, the Chinese-Latin American relation is predominantly core-peripheral. For example, in 2010 Argentine exported 73.7% of raw materials and 11.7% of crude petroleum oil to China; and 98% Chinese manufactured goods had exported to Argentina in the same year.[2] This situation is similar in Brazil, which exported 78.2% of primary commodities to China in 2009, and Mexico, because this country exported 56.7% of primary commodities to China in the same year, [2] although the trade with China only represented 0.5 percent of Mexican exports in 2010 [15] and 89.7 percent of bilateral trade corresponded to Chinese sales in 2011. [42]

However, and from an opposite perspective, Jiang Shi Xue affirms that “Latin America’s terms of trade are turning for the better over the last several years”<sup>(6)</sup>. Certainly, the prices of raw materials grew faster than manufactured goods and reversed the relative prices. It changed the terms of trade and it has altered the core-peripheral model in favor of Latin American countries in the first decade of the twenty-first century. But the new relative prices did not change the exchange structure, as we have seen in the case of Argentine-Chinese bilateral trade. Chinese scholars also claim that China is a developing country because their economic structure combines the developed Eastern region with very poor Central and Western regions. This argument

(6) Jiang Shi Xue argues that: “Because of the China factor, however, Prebisch’s argument now appears to be incorrect. On the one hand, China’s large imports of resources and raw materials have pushed up prices in the world market, greatly benefiting Africa and Latin America; on the other, due to low labor cost, China’s exports of manufactured goods are relatively cheap. As a result, Africa and Latin America’s terms of trade are turning for the better over the last several years” [22].

is partially true, but—with the exception of a very few countries—the Wallerstein’s core-semiperipheral-peripheral scheme turns out to predominate in the rest of world [45]. Then, if we select one unit of analysis (the State) we must consider the State data (GDP or PPP) and it is necessary to exclude special domestic situations or those that do not meet the criteria being applied. In fact, from an integral power perspective, and especially in the economic level, since 1999 China is part of the select *club* of great nations.[35] This *club* only includes core powers: members capable of managing global governance and change the international order rules.

Different from the argument expressed in this article (which, needless to say, reflects the author’s opinion), Chinese scholars and officials consider that Argentina-China relations are based in a South-South cooperation model, based on the GDP per capita of both countries. But such an approach is highly questionable. For instance, in 2011 China’s GDP per capita was US\$ 5,445, while that of Argentina was US\$ 10,941 –over twice as much as China’s. In spite of the fact that, according to the World Bank criterion<sup>(7)</sup>, both nations are considered as “upper middle income” economies in terms of GDP per capita, it becomes evident that Argentina is positioned on the upper border of this category. Furthermore, and if the economies of the two countries are considered in terms of PPP per capita, a remarkably similar gap would be observed: in 2011 China reached only US\$ 8,450, a figure that was more than doubled by Argentina’s US\$ 17,250 –again, over twice as much as that of China and even becoming a “high income” economy, having exceeded the criterion of US\$ 12,476 PPP per capita –the division line between “upper middle income” and “high income” economies.

Therefore, and in light of the abovementioned GDP or PPP per capita figures, even the basic claim of the Chinese perspective would be mistaken: the Argentina-China relation would not be a South-South model, but rather it turns out to be a North-South model, with PPP per capita indicators positioning Argentina in the North and China in the South. As aforementioned, such a self-contradictory conclusion would be the opposite of the argument being made in this paper, which considers China as positioned in the North and Argentina in the South. In both the Chinese and Argentine cases, the distortion appears evident because the GDP or PPP indicators would be taken as being distributed between an overpopulated country (China) and another that suffers from subpopulation (Argentina). This mistaken point of view will inevitably disturb the clear understanding of the relation and we must come back to the core-periphery model, according to GDP or PPP data.

As a conclusion of the first part of this article, we can argue that the linkage between Argentina and China after 1999 was framed in the core-peripheral scheme (namely, China-Argentina), according to economic capabilities of the two countries, positions in the international structure, and also by the terms of trade interactions.


(7) “Economies are divided according to 2011 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, \$1,025 or less; lower middle income, \$1,026 - \$4,035; upper middle income, \$4,036 - \$12,475; and high income, \$12,476 or more” [48].



## 2. The Positions of Latin American Countries Toward the new Chinese International Division of Labor

Since 1978, Deng Xiao Ping’s economic reforms removed the traditional isolationism of China and put into practice the export-production model, with gradual integration into the world economy. The Chinese reform created a virtuous circle of investments, production and market, under macroeconomic stability and peaceful environment as prescribed by nineteenth-century liberalism (see Fig. 2). These foreign investments were used to build joint ventures or exclusive capital firms to produce several different kinds of goods in China’s special economic zones (SEZ) and export goods abroad. With foreign investments and international market, the Chinese government created the *world factory*. At the same time, it formed the domestic market (and enlarged the civil society) [17], formerly smaller because the planning limited the relation between supply and demand in times of Chairman Mao. The key to the successful reformation has been the fusion between totalitarian regime and the gradual liberalization and marketization of the domestic economy [50], externally oriented toward the open-door policy, manufactured goods exports and international reserves accumulation. After more than three decades of continuous growth, the Chinese state was “deeply embedded in global capitalism” [6].

Fig. 2 Chinese export-production model and market creation



Source: author’s elaboration.

The export-production model searches economic partners for the normal functioning of the virtuous circle. In this context, the ideology of the model appears in 1993 when the Chinese government included the concept of *strategic partnership relation* in the Chinese-Brazilian joint declaration signed during the visit of President Jiang Ze Min to Brazil. Since then, expressions such as “strategic partnership,” “strategic associations”

or “strategic relations” have been frequently used in Chinese books, articles, documents and other publications, which are part of an official classification of China’s international links.

The examination of these documents reveals a certain behavior model, but the Chinese political praxis introduces the concept in a general way to countries at different levels of political, economic and social development; without creating a coherent field of application. In fact, there seems to be no parameter for selecting strategic partners. Superpowers like the United States; organizations like the European Union or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; developing countries such as Argentina and Brazil; and smaller powers such as the Philippines or Egypt all fall under the same category. Australia, Italy, Poland, Sri Lanka and other states have a “general associative relation” that seems to fall in the lower range of strategic relationships (see Fig. 3).

Fig. 3 China’s strategic partnerships in the world



Countries: Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Egypt, Philippines, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, United Kingdom, Ukraine, United States, Venezuela and Vietnam.

States with high level of cooperation and structural conflict with China (such as United States, Japan and India) are strategic partners, the same as Argentina and Brazil, which lack any similar problematic background. Also in South America, six countries have strategic partner status with China: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Before the visit of Wen Jia Bao to Chile on July 2012, when the relation between both governments was upgraded to strategic relations, there are substantive differences between Argentina and Brazil with Chile because the three countries appeared to differ in the status that China att-

ches to each of them. China and Brazil maintain a longstanding strategic association; with Argentina the strategic relationship started in 2004 and with Chile, the relationship transited from the concept of “general economic associative relationship[3]” toward strategic partnership. That is, Brazil and Argentina used to be a step forward of Chile, but the Chinese-Chilean economic relation has grown faster than the Chinese-Argentine one in the last decade. Meanwhile, Mexico is a case in the middle, with Chinese trade competition in its domestic market and that of the United States, without reaching the levels of conflict that China had in its political relations with India or the United States in modern history. Interestingly Japan, one of the most important trading partners of the PRC, joined this list later. Both countries that do not recognize China as a market economy, as the United States and European countries, and those that do recognize China as such (i.e., most of the countries in the world) have strategic relations with the PRC. Therefore, it is difficult to perceive a parameter to establish what differences exist between a “strategic partner” and a “non-strategic partner”. In our opinion, the *strategic partnership* is an ideological concept, focuses on the economic interests of the parties that make up the association, positioning China as the axis of a new financial and commercial *entente*<sup>(8)</sup>, based on the specialization of functions and connected through a multiplicity of agreements, excluding traditional military aspects; although they form the core content of the concept of strategy, both in China and the West[36].<sup>(9)</sup>

Latin American countries are not outside of this *entente*. In the more than 30 years of economic modernization, China has used a lot of natural resources and other raw materials. After despoiling its reserves in minerals and energy resources and also due to the fast increase in the demand of renewable resources, China's government had to deploy an economic diplomacy to search for these goods abroad, especially in Africa and Latin America. Jiang clearly asserts: “It is a well-known fact that China's own resources are not enough to sustain high growth rate. For this reason, it is imperative for China to acquire resources from external sources, including Africa and Latin America.”[22] This situation has raised the role of Latin American countries in China's foreign policy and this is one important reason why the Chinese government published the first *policy paper* on Latin American and the Caribbean in November 2008[33].


(8) According to the Oxford Dictionary, the *entente* is “a friendly understanding or informal alliance between states or factions”. The *Entente Cordiale* signed in 1904 between France and Britain is the typical example. But, for the purposes of our study, the most important is the *Entente Cordiale* between the same countries in the first middle part of the nineteenth century (1830-1837 and 1844-1847) when there was no formal agreement, but rather a basic consensus in the international politics between the two powers.

(9) The Chinese dictionary defines strategy as “plan or general direction of the war”[7]. As in the West, the term is associated with the tactic, defined as “principles and methods of the battle”[7]. The strategy, called in Chinese *zhanlüe* (战略), is composed of two ideograms: *zhan* (战), which refers to war or *zhanzheng* (战争), and *lüe* (略) that means plan, among other uses. The tactic or *zhanshu* (战术) also comprises the ideogram *zhan* (战), to which is added the character *shu* (术), which is understood as art, method or skill. That is, both have the character war as base, but one relates to the general planning, the other is the art or method of struggle, combat or battle. On the other side, to form a military alliance or aligned in Chinese means *jiemeng* (结盟). Separately, the character *jie* (结) means to unite, bind or form, while *meng* (盟) means alliance. From that China executed a peaceful diplomatic orientation in the early eighties, which was not aimed to unite military allies but partners, and that is *jieban* (结伴), which *ban* (伴) means precisely partner or teammate in Chinese. This is the origin of the concept of strategic associative relationship (战略协作关系) or strategic partner (战略伙伴) in the Chinese language.

The bandwagon effect is evident in the relationship being examined. China's interest in raw materials drags Latin American economies and these nations are integrated in the Chinese growth model. This is a good example of what Robert Keohane has called "harmony." According to this author, harmony "refers to a situation in which actors' policies (pursued in their own self-interest without regard for others) automatically facilitate attainment of the other's goals [25]." This concept of harmony is different from the one expressed by President Hu Jin Tao, when in political discourses he repeatedly stated the phrase of "harmonious society" in the sense of maintaining the balance of society, according to Confucian thinking.

Complementary interests appear in the core-periphery model: Latin American countries sell raw materials to China; buy Chinese industrial goods; and China invests more in non-renewable resources of Latin America (and several Latin American firms invest in China). This is the real situation of the economic ties throughout the last decade, a period of time during which "China has become much more important as a trading partner for many Latin American countries" [15]. However, discord and tensions emerge in the relationship when these countries expand their industrialization processes; add most value to their exportations or try to ensure local labor. For example, the *dilemma* of non-renewable resources in the rivalry of Chinese and Latin American modernizations; the dispute of investment originated in third regions; the Chinese export competition on third markets; and the protectionist reaction against the offensive entry of the Chinese products in the region, indicate a more contentious relationship than the one that has been maintained until now, except in those countries that are backing the *primarization* of their economy [27]. According to Keohane, policy coordination can lead to cooperation to solve these discord points: "Intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination [25]". At present, Sino-Latin American economic relations move from harmony toward cooperation through a process of policy coordination (see Fig. 4).


Fig. 4 From harmony to cooperation



The potential threat hanging over the modernized objectives of both parties' disturbs harmony and produces discord, and seeks to be solved with the coordination of policies. Because China's rise in the international economic structure is a contemporary matter, the process of policy coordination has started in recent years. In the case of China, its growth is limited by the lack of natural resources and the government decides to activate the supply channels with foreign investments that allow them to continue the process of modernization. Meanwhile, if Argentina continues in this global circuit, the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith automatically produces the *primarization* of the exports; with goods representing 33 percent of the exports total

in 2009 (see Fig. 5), although the industrial sector of the Argentina's economy remained stable at 31 percent in the last decade<sup>(10)</sup>, according to 2010 World Bank data[47]. For that reason, Argentine President Cristina-Fernandez de Kirchner's government (as well as DilmaRousseffin Brazil) puts the purchase of Argentine manufactured goods by China as claim on the bilateral agenda. That is, where compatible, policy coordination will lead to cooperation, or in case of incompatibility, will exacerbate discord. In this regard, China has been the initiator of this action, because Keynesian thinking explains that the Chinese demand activates the Latin American economies and their reactions before the stimulus of this exogenous factor. In this sense, nothing has changed the "reactive style" of Latin American policies asserted by Luis Maira in the 1980s [28].

Fig. 5: Share of manufactured goods in the exports of several Latin American countries and China



Source: World Bank, World Development Report. [47]

However, according to how Latin American governments define their policies toward China, the harmony of economic exchange could change into cooperation or, on the contrary, into deeper discord. In this sense, the political will of each unit is an important factor and appears as external behavior, expressed through products [12] or political decisions to endorse a relations model. In general, there are two trends in Latin America: 1) the countries that want to deploy relations with China under the core-peripheral scheme and adapt their economies to Chinese international division of labor; 2) those political units that recognize the real situation but support the *de-primarization* of their economies to surpass the traditional core-peripheral model. In the first case, complementary interests will be greater than conflictive interests; in the second, tension will clearly coexist with complementary interest and would increase at the same rhythm of the *de-primarization* process advance [27]. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that the *primarization* of the economies is only one among several other discord factors regarding the clash of modernization processes between China and Latin America.

(10) In 2011, the restrictions to imports applied by the Argentine government and the impact of the world crisis caused the share of the country's industrial sector to drop from 31 to 26 percent.

As regards the bilateral aspect of the relation, the consequence of harmony has not been a “win-win” relationship until now. If we compare the last 20 years of GDP figures, the Argentine-Chinese economic ties describe an increasingly asymmetrical relation, similar to that of other Latin America countries. In 1991, Argentina’s economy was 50 percent of Chinese economy; and in 2011 only represented 6.1 percent (see Table 2). This is because even though Latin American economies obtained good benefits from China and experienced fast growth rates, the Chinese economy grew even faster than them.

**Table 2 Percentage of several Latin American economies’ size regarding China**

Countries	In GDP (current US\$)		
	1991	2001	2011
Argentina	50.0%	20.3%	6.1%
Brazil	107.3%	41.8%	33.9%
Chile	9.4%	5.1%	3.4%
Mexico	82.8%	46.9%	15.8%
Paraguay	1.6%	0.5%	0.3%
Peru	8.9%	4.2%	2.4%
Uruguay	2.9%	1.6%	0.6%
Venezuela	13.6%	9.3%	4.3%

Source: World Bank. [46]

As a preliminary conclusion of this second section, it can be argued that the Chinese model of growth has created a new international division of labor that produce a bandwagon effect in Latin American economies, which are considered as raw material suppliers by China. Both strategic partners and non-strategic partners in Latin America are inserted in this model. The aforementioned harmony is the main characteristic of the virtuous cycle of investments, production and market, but several discord points have appeared in the relationship and the process of policy coordination attempting to solve them. In this regard, Argentina and the other Latin American countries would have two diametrically opposed policy options toward the Chinese model of growth: 1) to continue deploying relations with China in accord with core-periphery scheme as well as adapt their economies to the Chinese international specialization or; 2) to recognize the real economic situation and simultaneously support the *de-primarization* of their economies to be able to overcome the core-periphery model. In the more than three decades of Chinese reform, Argentina has obtained advantage in trade; but in terms of Wallerstein’s long cycle [45], Argentina is in a more peripheral position with respect to China than it was 30 years ago and the relation has also become more asymmetrical. As it can be seen, the consequences of the harmony have not been as beneficial to Argentina and other Latin American economies as is generally believed.

### 3. The Case of the Economic Relations Between Argentina and China

The considerable geographical distance, a history characterized by friendship and the absence of serious conflicts, together with the rise of China in the international economic scene make these two countries have common and complementary interests. However, due to the fact that the two nations seek to implement modernization processes, certain contradictory interests also appear in this relation and we must make clear both aspects of the economic linkage.

#### 3.1. The Harmony Level

In the first place, it must be mentioned that Argentina and China have competitive agricultural and livestock production structures, in the same way that Argentina has historically traditional rivalries with the United States, Australia and Canada. However, China's overpopulation, the successful economic reform and China's lack of raw material and food resources, have created temporary complementary interests between the two countries, and that provides the opportunity to build an economic *entente*. This is a *strategic partnership* in the vision of the Chinese government; a concept that denotes an economic coalition between an important food producer and the world's second largest consumer. The existing harmony in this economic *entente* includes two major aspects: bilateral trade and Chinese investments in Argentina.

#### a) Complementary Interests in the Trade Relation

Trade is the most important part of this bilateral economic relation. When President Lanusse recognized the government of People's Republic of China in 1972, only 0.12 percent of Argentina's total exportations were sold to China, and 0.02 percent of the Argentine total importations were bought from this country. In 2008, when economic crisis erupted, the trade relation attained the most important level until the start of the second decade of twenty-first century: 9.06 percent of the Argentine total exportations have been sold to China and 11.38 percent of imports came from this country (see Table 3) [37].


In addition to that, the structural change of trade destinations by continent took place during the presidency of Néstor Kirchner. The decline in sales to Europe and the rise of exports to Asia had its turning point in 2007, when for the first time exportations to Asia exceeded those destined to Europe. Because of this situation, Argentina needed to open new commercial offices in the Orient (such as the new consulate in Guangzhou) while preserving the existing one in Europe, with the consequent expansion of the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy. Obviously, this transformation was promoted by trade with the PRC, which represented almost 50 percent of sales to Asia in that year. On the other hand, while Argentina continues to complain in international forums about trade restrictions on agricultural goods applied by the European Union and other nations, it has found a new trade partner in China, since not only did Chinese food demand raise international prices but mitigated the lack of markets that Argentina suffered, for example, in the 1980s.

**Table 3 Ten main Argentina’s export partners (2000-2010)**

	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010
1	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil	Brazil
2	<b>United States</b>	Chile	Chile	Chile	<b>China</b>	<b>China</b>
3	Chile	<b>United States</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>United States</b>	Chile
4	Spain	Spain	<b>China</b>	<b>China</b>	Chile	<b>United States</b>
5	Uruguay	<b>China</b>	Spain	Spain	Netherlands	Netherlands
6	China	Netherlands	Netherlands	México	Spain	Spain
7	Netherlands	Italy	Mexico	Netherlands	Uruguay	Germany
8	Italy	Mexico	Italy	Uruguay	Italy	Italy
9	Paraguay	Germany	Germany	Germany	Germany	Uruguay
10	Germany	Uruguay	Uruguay	Italy	Venezuela	Irán

The bilateral exchange shows high concentrations of Argentine sales in a few products and the preponderance of raw materials in its components, particularly from the soybean sector. In 2010, five products concentrated 90 percent of Argentine total exports to China (see Fig. 6). Four of them were renewable resources or by-products and accounted for 78.1 percent of the exported total values (soybean, crude soybean oil, sunflowers oil and chicken scrap or offal); while crude petroleum oil, as a by-product of non-renewable resources, only accounted for 11.5 percent [2].

**Fig. 6: Five main Argentine products exported to China in 2010**




Source: National Institute of Statistics and Census of Argentina (INDEC)



The Chinese exports to Argentina are highly concentrated in industrial goods (98 percent of the total) and the primary sector products are almost nonexistent, without exceeding 2 percent of total imports in 2010 (see Fig. 7). Different from Argentine sale figures, the top ten products imported from China only accounted for 22.4 percent.

**Fig. 7: Ten main Chinese products exported to Argentina in 2010**

Total imports: 7.648 US millions dollars



Source: National Institute of Statistics and Census of Argentina (INDEC)

It is noteworthy that Sino-Argentine trade relations have a special problem: both countries differ on their trade statistics, as measured by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) and its Argentine counterpart, the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC). According to the data provided by NBSC, the Chinese government sees Argentina as the only “winner” in the trade relation (see Table 5). In contrast, and according to INDEC data, the Argentine government perceives China as the “winner” or, at least, has a vision of a “win-win” relationship<sup>(11)</sup> (see Table 4).

**Table 4: Argentine-Chinese trade (2001-2010)**

Year	Exports	Imports	Total	Balance
2001	1.224	1.113	2.337	+ 111
2002	1.177	342	1.519	+ 835
2003	2.581	742	3.323	+ 1.838

(11) Huang Long Zhi also envisioned this problem, noting that, according to Chinese data, the situation would be unsustainable over time [18].

2004	3.055	1.737	4.792	+ 1.318
2005	3.336	2.270	6.489	+ 1.066
2006	3.646	3.153	6.799	+ 493
2007	5.166	5.092	10.258	+ 74
2008	6.397	7.104	13.501	- 707
2009	3.698	4.823	8.521	- 1.125
2010	5.858	7.648	13.506	- 1.790

Source: National Institute of Statistics and Census of Argentina (INDEC), 2002-2011.

Unit: US million dollars.

Excluded: Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.

Indeed, while Argentina accumulated surplus recorded by INDEC reached US\$ 2,113 million between 2001 and 2010, for the NBSC was US\$ 19,222 million, about nine times more than the INDEC figure in the same period. The most controversial year is 2008, when, according to the NBSC, Argentine surplus amounted to US\$ 4,320 million; while, according to INDEC, the Chinese surplus reached US\$ 707 million. As aforementioned, the Chinese government—supported by its official statistical data—demands a “win-win” relation to its Argentine counterpart, who—in turn—considers that such a relation already exists, based on its own INDEC data.

**Table 5 Argentine-Chinese trade (2001-2010)**

Year	Exports	Imports	Total	Balance
2001	1.281	573	1.854	+ 708
2002	1.239	185	1.424	+ 1.054
2003	2.729	447	3.176	+ 2.282
2004	3.254	852	4.106	+ 2.402
2005	3.799	1.325	5.124	+ 2.474
2006	3.700	2.003	5.703	+ 1.697
2007	6.335	3.566	9.901	+ 2.769
2008	9.360	5.040	14.400	+ 4.320
2009	4.310	3.480	7.790	+ 830
2010	6.802	6.116	12.918	+ 686

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC)

Unit: US million dollars.

Exclude Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.

To the historical problem of dissimilar data, it should be added the manipulation of statistics that has taken place in recent years. Since November 2008, the Ministry of Commerce of China has stopped publishing data on foreign trade by countries on its website, which was of free public access in Chinese. The timing was not appropriate, as it provoked uncertainty about the motivation of such a decision. In addition to this circumstantial problem, there was a host of suspicions about the reliability of Chinese statistics that have been shown in several academic papers [8,29]. According to these authors, trade data appear to be the most reliable in the world of Chinese statistics, but there are overwhelming complaints based on the fact that the values of Chinese exports set by the importing country are always higher than that declared by China.

There are also different amounts in exports to China, probably referring to the commodities (as soybean, soy oil and so on) sold to China. However, it could be the case that, once at sea, the ship decides to change its destination to one that demands the same product, although it is doubtful that the Argentine government relegates mass money that may fall into the coffers of the national treasury by rights unrecorded exports. However, the Argentine Federal Administration of Public Revenue (AFIP) not only investigated sales to China [10] in the past, but also in December 2010 its manager signed in Beijing a tax information exchange agreement looking to detect financial “inconsistencies in trade flows [9].” At the same time, the change in measurement methodology used by INDEC has undermined the credibility and prestige of the institution, even though such change does not seem to be oriented to foreign trade data<sup>(12)</sup>.

If there is no concordant vision in the trade data, solving the problem of different governmental perception seems an arduous task. Thus, official statistics provide growing instability in the Argentine-Chinese trade, creating incongruent perceptions between both governments that influence their decision making [37].

### **b) A Turning Point of the Chinese Investments in Argentina?**

Since 2005, the Latin American region is the second largest destination of China's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) [43]. In 2010, Latin America received 15.3 percent of China's total outward FDI flows, second only to Asia and ahead of Europe and North America (see Table 6).

(12) In recent Argentina trade reports released by the INDEC, the item “China” includes Hong Kong and Macao, a situation that was not previously registered. Although both enclaves are already under Chinese sovereignty, the data inclusion mitigated the impact of the deficit with China, to the extent that sales to Hong Kong had surpluses of US\$ 261 million in 2009 and US\$ 89 million in the first four months of 2010 [19]. While these figures do not substantively alter the values mentioned, the inclusion of both enclaves appeared just since the beginning of Chinese surplus in bilateral trade. Anyway, the “INDEC Informa” report still continues to record disaggregated data from China, Hong Kong and Macao, a practice that should be continued by the institute to maintain the credibility of its records.

**Table 6. Chinese investments in the World - 2010**

Region and continent	Percentage
Asia	65.2 %
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>15.3 %</b>
North America	3.8 %
Europe	9.8 %
Africa	3.1 %
Oceania	2.7 %

Source: 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment [43].

Unit: millions of US dollars.

Total: 68.811 millions of US Dollars.

The 91.2 percent of Chinese investments to Latin America concentrated in two “tax havens”: Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands. The remaining 8.8 percent has been directly invested in the other Latin American countries (see Table 7). However, according to the data of Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Chinese investment policy to Latin America made a turning point in 2010, especially in Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Colombia and Argentina [5]. In contrast, and according to the data of China Ministry of Commerce, there is not any significant change in the investment flows by countries (see Table 7). Clearly these Chinese investments have come into Latin American countries through Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong or other “tax havens”.

**Table 7 Main destinations of non-financial FDI of the PRC in Latin America - 2005-2010**

Country	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
<b>Argentina</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>-22</b>	<b>27</b>
Bolivia	0	18	1	4	18	3
Brazil	15	10	51	22	116	487
Chile	1	6	3	0	7	33
Cayman Is.	5162	7832	2601	1524	5366	3496
Virgins.	1226	538	1876	2104	1612	6119
Mexico	3	-3	17	5	0	26
Paraguay	-	-	-	3	6	27


Peru	0	5	6	24	58	139
Venezuela	7	18	69	9	115	94
Latin America and the Caribbean	6.466	8.468	4.902	3.677	7.329	10.538
WorldTotal	12.261	17.633	26.508	55.907	56.528	68.811

Source: 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment [43].

Unit: US millions dollars.

Originally, the situation of Chinese investments in Argentina is similar to that of other Latin American countries. In fact, and according to Chinese data, the total Chinese FDI in this South American country only reached US\$ 160 million between 2003 and 2010 (see Table 7 and Fig. 8). However, there are two turning points in the bilateral financial relations: the first and less important one took place in 2007, when the totality of Chinese investments in Argentina surpassed the total of Argentine investments in China. The second and most important happened in 2010, when several Chinese firms conducted very significant investment operations through “tax heavens”, without registered directly in Argentina. These operations have changed the face of Chinese investments in Argentina and the year 2010 became the turning point in this matter.

Fig. 8: Chinese investments in Argentina




Source: 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment [43].

Chinese investments have changed the pessimistic expectations that Argentine political leaders and public opinion had since the visit of President Hu Jin Tao in 2004. Two years later, a Chinese governmental consortium acquired the Sierra Grande iron mine in the southern province of Rio Negro, which had been closed since 1991. Subsequently, the China Metallurgical Group Corporation acquired a 70 percent stake of it, with a concession for 30 years. In March 2010, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) bought 50 percent of the Bidas Energy Holding in US\$ 3,100 million. At the end of 2010 the Chinese state

company Sinopec announced the purchase of Occidental Petroleum in Argentina for 2,450 million dollars. In addition, one Shaanxi province firm has invested in the production of urea on the Tierra del Fuego province. However, similarly to others Latin American countries, the Chinese statistical data recorded only US\$ 27 million of investment in Argentina that year. According to ECLAC, in 2010 the total of Chinese investments in Argentina has reached US\$ 6,193 million (see Fig 9). In 2011, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) purchased 80 percent of the local subsidiary of Standard Bank, valued at US\$ 600 million. The same year, the Argentine-Chinese Bidas Energy Holding acquired Exxon Mobil Argentina in US\$ 720 million.

**Fig. 8 Chinese investments in Argentina**



Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) [14]

The modification of China's investment policy could be associated to four causes:

- The Chinese government estimated that China's economy will grow during as well as after the global economic crisis finished and it will need more raw materials to continue producing in the "Chinese factory" and ensure food and energy security;
- The intensification of the struggle between great powers on strategic raw materials (such as oil, gas, minerals and food) and the necessity of China to control the supply channels.
- The volatility of the US dollar and other international currencies forced China to change a part of accumulated reserves for influence and control of business assets.
- Chinese enterprises are undergoing the process of trans-nationalization and of improvement of their international competitiveness, taking advantage of the global crisis and their highly competitive profile in the domestic economic.


### 3.2. Collision Points Between the Modernizations Processes of Argentina y China

As aforementioned there are not great conflicts in the history of Argentine-Chinese relations[37]. From this perspective, an emerging crisis in the bilateral trade (as the decision of the Chinese government to ban the imports of Argentine soybean oil in 2010) becomes insignificant within the framework of a non-confrontational past. Indeed, Argentina has historically maintained a continuous and unaltered foreign policy toward the Chinese state, based on the unconditional recognition of the “one-China principle” [37]. Simultaneously, since the adoption of the *soft politics* and modernization processes in both countries, several opposing interests have appeared in the economic linkage. In this sense, the abovementioned soybean crisis could seem to be one of certain importance, capable of interfering in the current Argentine economic orientation. Then, the crisis can be observed from either a global and historical process or from a short-time and economic linkage perspective, with different results. From the latter point of view, the most important collision points between the competitive processes of modernization in both countries are the following:

#### a) Economic De-primarization and the Rise of Trade Tension

Since the beginning of the century, demand from China, India and other emerging countries pushed the international prices of raw materials and promoted the boom of the Latin American primary sector, in appreciating the value of local currencies at the expense of the competitiveness of the industrial sector (see Fig. 10). This new version of the so-called Dutch disease<sup>(13)</sup> tends to the specialization and *de-industrialization* of the economies in order to consolidate the core-peripheral scheme with China and other emerging countries. Latin American states, like Chile and Peru, agreed to this scheme and have signed free trade agreements with China. Brazil has not signed this kind of agreement but the impact of the Dutch disease on Brazilian exports is similar to that of these two countries (see Fig. 5). Foreign investments and commodities sales have facilitated the entry of foreign currencies and it appreciated the local currency, but deteriorated the competitiveness of Brazilian industry and exaggerated the value of GDP, placing this nation among the major economies of the world. Is Argentina destined to *primarize* its economy and to damage its industrial sector in a similar fashion to that developed by other Latin American countries? How to prevent the boom in the primary sector of the economy from delaying the expansion of the industrial sector? For Argentina, is it necessary to cross through the *primarization* stage to modernize its economy and achieve economic development? These questions have been analyzed by the Argentine government, which has adopted an exchange policy, for example, different from that of the Brazilian government, for instance.

(13) The Dutch disease refers to the discovery of deposits of oil and natural gas in the North Sea and the significant increase and sudden wealth of the Netherlands in the 1960s. This good fortune had repercussions in other sectors of the economy, as foreign currency earnings and the appreciated guilder hurt the competitiveness of non-oil exports. Although it relates to the discovery of some natural resource, it can spread to other events that generate foreign currency income, as the remarkable surge in natural resource prices, foreign aid or foreign direct investment[13].



While Argentina exports commodities and China's demand remain constant, complementation is viable and growing. In addition, because the Chinese process incorporates the excluded population into its market and raises the level and quality of domestic demand, business expectations are encouraging<sup>(14)</sup>. At the same time, there is tension in the bilateral relationship when Argentina adds value through industrialization. The *de-primarization* of non-traditional exports increased trade friction with China, as happened in the soybean oil crisis in 2010. The Argentine trade policy seeks to industrialize the soybean to add value to its exports; while Chinese policy seeks the purchase of such commodity and its transformation in the Huadong region, as we have seen during the examined crisis (see Fig. 11).

(14) *See China será el mayor agroimportador mundial dentro de cinco a diez años*, in *América Economía*, 11-07-2011, <http://www.americaeconomia.com/negocios-industrias/china-sera-el-mayor-agroimportador-mundial-de-cinco-diez-anos>. Accessed on 6 December 2011.



### Figure 11: Causes of soybean crisis

- The Chinese ban of the Argentine soybean oil imports has been a non-tariff or retaliatory for anti-dumping policy to Chinese products. However, the government considers that has been a technical problem (according to BT 15: Chinese phyto-sanitary requirement).
- The struggle for the crushing of soybean: Argentina and China compete to produce soybean oil, especially between Great Rosario area and Huadong region. It is clear wherever place the soybean is industrialized will be the place in which employment will be created, value added and taxes levied by governments.
- Since the international economic crisis erupted, both governments sought to correct imbalances in their foreign trade. Especially after 2008, when the two parties adopted protectionist policies: in China, appeared the New Deal with Chinese characteristics; in Argentina, the expansion of internal market. Both governments want to have a balance in the external sector.
- Because the data of the two national statistical institutions has differ greatly, both governments have a distorted perception to the other at time of make decisions in their relations.
- Human rights issues have disturbed the environment of the relations between the two countries. China's restrictions could be regarded as a counter-measure to the decision of Argentine judge Aráoz De Lamadrid on human rights violations in China.
- The cancellation of the visit to China of President Cristina Fernandez in January 2012 was considered another probable cause which led to Chinese retaliation. [38]

Argentina, an exporter of raw material and food, sees China as a main partner, especially for its need to maintain food security. The dependency is kept in the field of renewable commodities, where soybean and its byproducts accounted for more than 78.1 percent of exports to this Asian country in 2010. However, the crisis about soybean oil did not produce the expected vulnerability, because Argentina's trade policy was able to mitigate the Chinese prohibition by placing volumes of soybean oil into alternative markets; processing into biofuels or selling soybean. As for imports, there are no Chinese products that cannot be acquired in other markets. Moreover, while China is an important partner of Argentina (representing about 10 percent of its sales) Argentine export markets have been decentralized to mitigate the risks, except Brazil, that concentrates more than 20 percent of them [34]. Therefore, from the interdependence theory [24] there was no observed vulnerability to disruption of Chinese purchases since there was no significant change in the policy framework.

#### b) Dilemma of Non-Renewable Resources<sup>(15)</sup>

For the “Chinese factory”, the stability of non-renewable resources is vital to continue its virtuous economic growth.

(15) Non-renewable resources are those whose reserves will inevitably end up at some point as it is not possible to produce, grow or regenerate to sustain its consumption rate. This means that the consumption of non-renewable resources exceeds the capacity of nature to recreate. Examples of non-renewable resources are oil, gas, coal, minerals, timber and water.

mic cycle. However, like China, Argentina has the purpose of economic modernization and needs more energy and minerals in the middle and long term. If a country expends its non-renewable resources at present, it will hinder its process of modernization in the future and the upcoming governments should seek them somewhere else, like China today pursues them all over the world after having plundered their resources. Contrary to this point, in short-time, the Argentine government obtains benefits from export non-renewable resources. Indeed, because these resources are limited, the long-term interests and future objective of modernization are in contradiction with short-time benefits, generating a dilemma in the determination of national interest about non-renewable resources. The exports of currently available resources are a challenge to future production and development. Therefore, from a pragmatic point of view and the long-term perspective of this economic sector (due to the potential strategic significance) it is necessary to safeguard them or to pursue and/or achieve a rational development to accomplish the goals of economic modernization of the country, and not only to supply them to other countries seeking their own economic growth. In the meantime, at least in the trade policy, the Argentine government should find balance between short and long-term interests.

The recent expropriation of 51 percent of the shares of Repsol Argentina's Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), the largest oil producing company in the country, reflects the abovementioned dilemma. This company, owned by the Spanish Repsol Group since 1998, due to various domestic and international circumstances, was exclusively focused on the extraction of oil from existing fields, leaving aside the exploration of new oil fields in the last decade. The no-exploration of new deposits, growing domestic demand and the continuity of sales to foreign countries, caused the depletion of Argentina's oil reserves. It is noteworthy that Argentina, having been an oil exporting country, eventually became an oil net importing one, with high impact on the trade balance; although it still has resources to explore and produce—such as shale oil and shale gas in Vaca Muerta field, in the Western region of Argentina's Neuquen Basin. Meanwhile, Chinese companies, like CNOOC and Sinopec, have bought assets of other Argentine oil companies, such as Bidas, because the oil market is oligopolistic in Argentina, and YPF controls only 32 percent of oil production and 23 percent of the gas in this country. For Chinese investments, this financial field is still vast, even in the same YPF<sup>(16)</sup>, which requires large investments to regain self-sufficiency in the country. In this regard, various conjectures have appeared about China, especially after the meeting between Presidents Fernandez and Obama in Cartagena, on April 2012. For example, the Financial Times reported that the Repsol group had advanced negotiations with Sinopec, who in secret attempted to sell its 57.4 percent interest in YPF; it broke down after the Argentine government announced that it would expropriate 51 percent of the company[23]. However, in the end, the problem depends on what will be done with the extracted oils, because Argentina needs it for national development and China, of course, for its modernization.

### c) Rivalry in Local and Third Markets

In the local market, there is a triple linkage among China's dumping; the formal granting by the Argentine

(16) The ownership structure of the company is as follows: 26.00 percent of state-owned, 25.00 of provincial owned, 25.46 of the Petersen group, 6.45 of Repsol group and 17.09 percent of other companies.

government of China's market economy status in 2004<sup>(17)</sup> and the anti-dumping measures to Chinese products adopted by Argentine authorities. As a reaction to these measures, the PRC's government banned the access of several Argentine products to the Chinese market, arguing "technical problems"—i.e., crude soybean oil, lemon, etc. However, China continued to buy crude soybean oil from the United States [38], a country with lower sanitary conditions than Argentina regarding this kind of product, at that time and until today. Even though the Asian country did not implement general protectionist measures, it applied specific sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures to certain products from Latin America [20].

Dumping is an unfair trade practice that involves the export of goods from one State to another at less than its value in the country of origin. China's characteristics (as enormous population, consumption level, a totalitarian regime, human rights and labor union problems) means costs and prices in the Chinese market are lower than those of the rest of world. This is because China not only does the classical dumping, but also social dumping and environmental dumping. Chinese dumping threatens to distort domestic markets in the world and the world responds with anti-dumping measures. The anti-dumping measures are a set of protective measures taken by a state in order to protect the domestic economy from the distortions produced by dumping policies of third states. The Argentine government applies anti-dumping to Chinese products to protect the internal market and production, as well as China protects its market from the competitiveness of Argentina's agricultural goods, if China produces these in its local market.

The problem has been how to establish the criterion to determine if China has been dumping. The Protocol of China accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) established that domestic prices could not be taken as reference for determination of dumping, unless the destination country of those products recognizes China as a market economy [49]. Therefore, the persistent anti-dumping measures applied by Latin American governments to Chinese products, have prompted Beijing's government to implement an offensive diplomacy towards the countries of the region to obtain the recognition of China as a market economy. In their efforts to deepen relations with China and under pressure from the threat of losing the Chinese market, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Jamaica, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela recognized the status of market economy, just as almost 100 members of WTO, except major economies like the European Union, United States, Japan and India. These economies continue comparing the price of Chinese exports with a third economy to define whether there is dumping (see Fig. 12).


Since China is a market economy for Argentina, this country should take into account the prices and costs in China, which as we know, are far away from international prices and costs, unless the Chinese government decides to appreciate the Yuan, a currency that has a decade of stability. The adoption of such a measure would be difficult to be made, because Chinese products would become uncompetitive internationally, and thus the PRC government pursues its recognition as a market economy in order to prevent the anti-dumping measures, and increase its exports. Besides, in the last decade there have been some problems that put pressure

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(17) In the first article of memorandum of understanding between Argentina and China about cooperation in trade and investment, Argentina government recognized China's market economy status and declares its decision not to apply any discriminatory treatment to imports from China.

re on the “Chinese factory,” such as rising raw material prices, labor costs and reduction of external markets. Therefore, Argentina made a positive contribution to the bilateral relationship by unilaterally limiting the application of antidumping measures [16] in exchange for gaining access to the Chinese market for a larger number of its products since 2004.

Fig. 12 Crisis, protectionism and WTO



After China obtained its recognition as market economy, it came to light that such a principle collided with local economic interests, especially in the context of the international crisis and the rise of Keynesian measures. In the first half of 2008, China was the main object of the anti-dumping investigations of other members of the WTO [32]. A report on the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System stated: “...the largest number of cases of anti-dumping investigations against China, started between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the fourth quarter of 2009, was initiated by the countries that granted China the status of market economy [26].” Such measures expose the rise of conflicting interests between Chinese products and Argentine local industrialization, making this kind of commitment meaningless.

Indeed, the “threat” of Chinese products was mitigated by the application of antidumping measures<sup>(18)</sup>. But the subprime mortgage crisis has exacerbated the protectionist policies and new frictions in trade led Argentine customs authorities to increase the control measures on imports [39] and setting special regulations

(18) Argentine dumping measures applied to air conditioners, tires, sunglasses, bearings and parts thereof, pesticides, flasks, stainless steel tubes, tapes, playing cards and microwave ovens [16].

for 21,600 sensitive products to prevent, as a result of the fall of the consumption in United States and Europe, their entry into the country and the subsequent distortion of the market. These measures immediately have been published by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, although with the caveat that it was not a restriction on imports but a measure to strengthen customs' control of these products, and it applied even to products that came from Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) [30]. On the contrary, the agreement between Argentina and Brazil to raise the Common External Tariff to various products (wine, peaches, dairy, textiles, shoes, wooden furniture, etc.) caused some concern in the Chinese government [31], especially after the G-20 meeting in Washington of 2008 decided not to take protectionist measures for one year. The problem continued even after President Fernandez de Kirchner visited China in July 2010, when a few days after her return to Argentina, the Ministry of Industry established anti-dumping measures on imports of Chinese textiles and food and liquids processing machines [40].

After October 2008, trade exchange was in a different situation from that of November 2004, when Argentina recognized China as a market economy. The parties were not immune to global crisis and protectionist policies. The economic axis evolved from two decades of booming international trade to the implementation of stimulus measures of domestic markets to overcome the world crisis. According to World Bank data, the share of goods and services exported to the rest of the world in relation with GDP, decreased in China from 39 percent in 2006 to 30 percent in 2010, and to a lesser extent in Argentina: from 25 percent to 22 percent in the same period (see Table 8).

**Table 8 Argentine and Chinese exports of goods and services (% of GDP) - 2006-2011**

Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Argentina	25	25	24	21	22	23
China	39	38	35	27	30	29

Source: World Bank. [46]

While Argentina was experiencing economic growth and developing its export capacity, Chinese competition emerged in third markets, just as Mexico has in United States [11] and Brazil in world market. For example, despite having geographical proximity and to be benefited by the free trade agreement with Brazil in the framework of MERCOSUR, in 2007 Argentina has been displaced by China from the traditional second place in the Brazilian market and China will also probably displace the United States as the largest trade partner of Brazil in 2012.

Argentina has always been prone to strengthen the dialogue between MERCOSUR and China, with the aim of using this institution to balance the asymmetrical relationship with China (and Brazil too). This dialo-

gue<sup>(19)</sup> began in 1997, but the lack of MERCOSUR's coordinated action to recognize China as a market economy and the failure of the good offices of Presidents Néstor Kirchner and Luiz Lula Da Silva, in order to persuade the government of Paraguay to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, were factors that stalled the process. In June 2004, under the presidency of Argentina, the fifth and last meeting was celebrated in Beijing.

The dialogue was resumed six years later, also under the pro-tempore presidency of Argentina. In this new opportunity, the MERCOSUR members received the Chinese proposal to make a feasibility study for the signing of a free trade agreement between MERCOSUR and China. It is probable that such a trade agreement can be reached by the two parties, but taking into consideration the terms of trade between them, the eventual exceptions to the liberalization would outweigh the number of liberalized products and would have a protectionist effect that would undermine free trade. The proposal of Premier Wen Jiabao would strengthen the first of the two aforementioned policy options: if they were to accept it, the Latin American governments not only would *primarize* their economies even more but, by so doing, they would even destroy the incipient integration area that MERCOSUR has created<sup>(20)</sup>. After rejecting the United States proposal on FTAA<sup>(21)</sup>, a free trade agreement with China should extend the asymmetry of Argentina with China, shorten its dependence on Brazil, but would be detrimental to the integration process of the block. In addition, the timing of the international crisis is not favorable to the signing of such an agreement. However, expectations are growing, especially since the reopening of the MERCOSUR-China dialogue allows Brazil to display a strong leadership role within the institution.

## Conclusion

As can be seen throughout this article, since 1999 the Argentine-Chinese economic relations were framed on a core-peripheral scheme, according to the economic capabilities of two countries, their positions in the international structure and terms of trade interactions. China is positioned as a member of the club of great economic powers and, on the other hand, Argentina is economically far from China (in 2011 it only represented 6.1 percent of the Chinese economy) and it is not part of the group of the top 20 economic powers in the world. The bandwagon effect has been positive to Argentine growth, but in terms of Wallerstein's long cycle, Argentina is now in a more peripheral position with respect to China than it was 30 years ago, and the relation has become more asymmetrical. This kind of interaction shows the variability on the industrializa-

(19) The term "dialogue" describes a state of the linkage not yet institutionalized. It should be clarified that the term "dialogue" when applied to the negotiation process, is a vague notion that represents the state of the linkage, which consists of diplomatic talks aimed at signing of a preferential tariff agreement or a free trade agreement between the MERCOSUR and this Asian country.

(20) A study of feasibility to sign a FTA has been done between MERCOSUR and South Korea in 2006. This kind of agreement would damage the MERCOSUR automotive complex, and requires that Korea removes the high tariffs on agricultural imports. However, according to this report, given the structures of trade and tariffs both MERCOSUR and Korea, a possible scheme of trade liberalization tends to deepen existing patterns of specialization. Nevertheless, the study also shows the existence of potential gains in intra-industry trade [4, 21].

(21) Free Trade Area of the Americas. In Spanish called ALCA: Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas.

tion level of the two states and, hence, different stages of modernizations processes.

Argentina is part of the new Chinese international division of labor, and is also a strategic partner of China in food, energy and a market for Chinese manufactured goods. In the two policy options toward the China's model of growth mentioned in the second section of this article, Argentina recognizes the core-peripheral character of the relation and simultaneously pursues the *de-primarization* of its economy to surpass the core-periphery model and to be able to advance in its modernization process. This is not an easy task because the Chinese industry is more competitive in the world and it competes anywhere, including Brazil, with whom Argentina has a free trade agreement in the frame of MERCOSUR. So, after being displaced from the top of the Brazilian market by China, the proposal for a feasibility study for the signing of a free trade agreement between MERCOSUR and China is a new threat to Argentina's industrial entrepreneurs with interests in Brazil.

The success of China's modernization has generated a special trade complementation, consisting in an economic coalition between a big food producer and a major consumer. This economic *entente* includes two areas of cooperation: bilateral trade and Chinese investments in Argentina. The latter have had their turning point in 2010, when several Chinese corporations invested in non-renewable resources through tax havens. Probably, this coalition will remain constant until China makes drastic changes in its agricultural policy, or the curve of population growth begins to decay, estimated by United Nations to occur on the late 2020s, although this growth has begun to slow down and is expected to exacerbate in 2015<sup>(22)</sup>. In addition, the *entente* will endure if the Chinese economy continues to grow and more Chinese people are incorporated into the economic system. In this sense, its government gradually will change quantity for quality in the protein level of the Chinese diet and likely being able to continue the alliance further into the future. This would be the so-called harmony level.

From the Chinese perspective, the strategic *entente* seeks to place each state within its own area of specialization, and this form of trade exchange *primarizes* the Argentine economy. Even more, China stimulates the Argentine economic *primarization*, and, consequently, there is only complementation in the trade of Argentine raw materials and Chinese manufactured goods. The crisis of crude soybean oil happened because Argentina surpassed the limits of this traditional model and increased its industrial capacities. The crisis shows that this product is highly competitive and representative of Argentina's foreign trade and it was limited in its access to Chinese market to protect Chinese industry interests, raising questions about whether a similar crisis showing the confrontation of the parties will be repeated in the future. The answer does not seem to be easy and depends on the development of Argentina's modernization and the expansion of the Chinese market. For Argentina, the example of soybean industrialization could be the model to follow with other commodities, but Chinese policy seeks to buy raw materials and to avoid buying manufactured products. On the other side of the economic arena, the turning point of Chinese investments in Argentina created the dilemma in the determination of national interest about non-renewable resources, the most badly needed

(22) According to the United Nations, in 2010 China's population amounted to 1,341 million. The organization estimates that in 2015 would be 1,369 million; in 2020, 1,387; and in 2025 would be 1,395. In 2030, China's population would drop to 1.393 million [44].

and wanted by China all over the world. Furthermore, the complementation in renewable resources can be continued until Argentina develops its industrial sectors, but the problem is that when the modernization arises, tension with China in this sector can emerge both in the domestic level as in third countries.

Finally, when analyzing Argentina's industrialization process, the shadow of the tense Chinese-Mexican trade relationship appears. The challenges of the bilateral relations come from how to solve eventual tensions that could emerge with China without following the conflicting's model of Chinese-Mexican trade. In fact, the Argentine-Chinese relations remain complementary in the core-peripheral scheme and, at the same time, discord could arise if Argentina continues the *de-primarization* process, industrializes its production and avoids falling into the new economic specialization scheme, where its only role would be as a raw materials supplier, just what has traditionally been. Precisely because of these reasons, the process of policy coordination seeks to solve the discord points that have emerged in the relationship. Thus, if cooperation is not developed, complementary interests will have to coexist with discord or rivalry. The success of process of policy coordination would solve this discord, and would move the relation from harmony to cooperation.

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# China and Venezuela: Ambitions and Complexities of an Improving Relationship

Xulio Ríos

## Introduction

The relationship between Venezuela and China presents a big dynamism and strategic scope. Regarding commercial issues, it is estimated that by the end of 2012 the bilateral trade could represent 31 times more than nine years earlier. The model of Sino-Venezuelan cooperation is characterized by a growing diversity, ranging from the oil industry and space technology, but also infrastructure, transport, etc. With and especially proper balance, Venezuela is not only a commodities supplier. On the other hand, the analysis of how the relationship flows between the two countries helps to clearly identify its contrasts, especially in the political order. Despite its complexity, understanding has not stopped growing since Hugo Chavez came to power in Caracas. His re-election last October 7, 2012 for another term ending in 2019 opens the expectation of an intensification of these processes.

Exchanges at different levels can be seen this essay.

## Economic Cooperation

China calls “pragmatic” the ambitious economic relationship with Venezuela that has been built, covering areas such as energy, agriculture, high technology or infrastructure construction, with the first two sectors favored by both governments. In total, more than 300 cooperation projects have been implemented or are in progress [8]. The Convention on Economic and Technical Cooperation signed in September 2000 is the driving framework of this process.

The following table gives a convincing insight into the evolution of bilateral trade, each time with significant rises, also reflecting the effects of the crisis in 2008. In the first ten years of the Bolivarian government, the rise in the trade balance is close to 5,000 per cent. Between 2003 and today, trade multiplied by 24. (Table 1).

## Evolution of trade between China and Venezuela

Year	Export (to China)	Import (of Venezuela)	Total dollars US
1993	24,469,790	49,122,963	73,592,753
1994	27,939,437	39,342,408	67,281,845
1995	15,699,531	57,715,816	73,415,347
1996	25,225,863	45,841,174	71,067,037
1997	30,924,041	110,869,168	141,793,209
1998	12,369,693	159,271,142	171,640,835
1999	25,867,317	149,274,876	175,142,193
2000	52,661,356	237,517,552	290,178,908
2001	104,330,434	414,193,658	518,524,092
2002	128,693,016	317,315,903	446,008,919
2003	543,180,000	199,237,000	742,417,000
2004	738,010,000	595,560,000	1,333,570,000
2005	1,234,120,007	907,853,237	2,141,973,244
2006	2,621,679,699	1,698,063,264	4,319,742,963
2007	3,013,572,545	2,834,950,433	5,848,522,978
2008	6,522,845,192	3,111,473,431	9,664,318,623
2009	4,330,576,840	2,811,168,157	7,141,744,997
2010	6,598,809,595	3,651,859,408	10,250,669,003
2011	11,507,930,354	6,527,187,031	18,035,117,385
2012			20,000 (estimated)

Source:

<http://ve.china-embassy.org/chn/smw/qian410/t216003.htm><http://ve.china-embassy.org/chn/smw/qian410/t216005.htm>

Decree of the General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China

Author interview with Ambassador Rocío Mancero, Beijing, October 18 2011

In the field of energy, it can be noted that Venezuela has become the fourth largest supplier of oil to China and its fifth largest trading partner in Latin America [17]. Shortly after the visit of Prime Minister Li Peng in 1996 and even without Chavez in the Venezuelan presidency in June 1997, the National Oil and Natural Gas China Corporation achieved through an international tender, the right to harvest in two old oil fields in Venezuela, worth US\$ 358 million dollars. Production began the following year. It was then the largest Chinese investment project in Latin America. Until the end of 1999, the total investment volume amounted to about US \$ 400 million dollars and 11 Chinese-funded enterprises were established in the country. At that time Venezuela had not expressed any interest in oil supplies to China with the excuse that its location was not favorable because of its remoteness.

In 2004, by agreement, Venezuela licensed to the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 12 wells Zumano mature oil field, which has large reserves of heavy crude. To this end Petrozumano SA was created, to perform exploration and production activities in the states of Anzoategui and Monagas.

In September 2009 it was announced an agreement between the two countries to extract together about 450,000 bpd of extra heavy crude in the Orinoco oil belt, the main energy reserve of the Latin American region. Thus, China's investment (US\$ 16,000 million dollars) was added to Russia (US\$ 20,000 million dollars) in the area. China also built drilling and oil platforms, railways and housing.

The projected commitments meant that in 2010, Venezuela cherish the goal of exporting to China about 1 million barrels a day, - to the U.S. currently exports 1.5 million. Other delayed to 2012 the culmination of this figure. On the other hand, the state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), took to build three oil refineries in the Chinese territory and Chinese oil companies involved in the construction and operation of refineries in the Orinoco basin, with the goal of not only exporting to China, but also to third countries. Furthermore, Chinese shipyards are building to Venezuela three double-hull super tankers to transport Venezuelan crude to China. Venezuela craves its own fleet of tankers to not depend on middlemen and save costs.

The development in progress of Block Junin 4 in Anzoategui belonging to the Orinoco Oil Belt, which includes the establishment of a joint venture between PDVSA and China's CNPC with an investment of US\$ 16,300 million dollars estimated initial production in 2012, 50 thousand barrels per day which will increase the production to reach 400 thousand barrels per day in 2016.

Additionally, through an agreement in September 2008 it was agreed the establishment of a joint venture between PDVSA and SINOPEC to develop the Junin Block 8 and the opportunity to participate in the development of Junín a project which involves the construction of a refinery in Cabruta in Guarico state with a processing capacity of 200 thousand barrels per day of extra-heavy crude [3]. This project will allow the extraction of 400 barrels per day. The agreement to operate in Junin 8 (also in the Orinoco Oil Belt) is of high importance because it has, roughly, with 40 billion barrels in reserve, twice the ones that the U.S. has on its territory to supply enough oil to China during the present century. China's investment under this operation amounts to US \$ 16,000 million dollars over the next three years.

It should be noted that the reserves of the Orinoco Belt, initially calculated at 234,000 million barrels of heavy and extra heavy oil, added to those already confirmed of 80,000 million barrels in other parts of Venezuela, place the South American country as the world's largest oil reserves.

On the other hand, once the reserves of the block are determined by the Boyacá Convention for Quantification Study Implementation and certification of reserves of the deposits, the development of it will proceed.

As for the refineries, Venezuela plans to build at least three on Chinese territory where they would prosecute its own crude oil, transported from Venezuela by a Venezuelan tanker fleet that will be built with Chinese technical assistance. The first of these refineries has been approved by the Asian nation and it will be located in Guangdong province, China. This is a joint venture between PDVSA and Petro China Company. It will have a refining capacity of 400 thousand barrels per day.

Another important investment that has taken place by both governments has been the Venezuelan acquisition of 28 drills in May 2006 to the CNPC. Nonetheless, the most ambitious project was conceived in August of that year through the Memorandum of Understanding for the Establishment of a joint venture for assembly and construction of drills between PDVSA and CTPDC (China Petroleum Technology & Development Corporation) by which it was established the China - Venezuela Industry Drills, SA located in the state of Anzoátegui. With the establishment of this company and the installation of manufactured drills in the country, Venezuela embarked on a process of substitution of the drills that are currently in operation, usually rented, having significant costs to the domestic industry to more than US \$ 50 000 dollars a day. In 2009 and 2010, the first two drills were joined that are operating in Anaco and Barinas, respectively.

The China National Offshore Oil (CNOOC) will also participate in the Mariscal Sucre Project. This PDVSA's project seeks to satisfy the domestic gas demand and eventually to expand to foreign markets. Proven gas reserves in Venezuela are valued at 5.67 trillion cubic feet. This is a potential business for Venezuela that with an incipient production forms a strategic alliance with China, the seventh largest producer of natural gas after the United States, Russia, the European Union, Iran, Norway and Qatar, to trace its production and China, for its hand, would use the excess production of gas to be exported by Venezuela.

In the mining industry, China and Venezuela have been conducting feasibility studies to allow the reactivation of the Venezuelan mining industries and the possibility of undertaking new equity firms together in this same area. Venezuela possesses great mineral wealth in iron, coal, gold, diamonds, aluminium, bauxite, however they have a nationalized basic industry that is unproductive and that needs to be relaunched through foreign direct investment. In this sense, the government of Hugo Chavez has advanced the so-called Socialist Guayana Plan 2009-2019, which puts in the hands of the working class the operation and control of basic industries, without neglecting the importance of China to assist refloating of these industries. In this way, China, through Chinalco (Aluminum Corporation of China), is investing US\$ 403 million dollars in CVG-Alcasa, Venezuelan aluminum company, for its revival.

Venezuela supplies at prices well below market, iron ore to China's Wuhan Iron & Steel Group (WISCO) through direct sales with the Corporación Venezolana de Guayana. These transactions are supported through a contract signed in 2009 to a term of 7 years, which will allow the steelworks to ensure the supply of this mineral at prices far below world market.

Nevertheless not all is oil and minerals. China annually produces 500 million tons of cereals. It is the first country in the world cereal production. Beijing has a great agricultural experience and can help Venezuela in promoting agriculture. In addition to providing equipment, some Chinese companies are already engaged in several projects related to irrigation systems. In fact, China actively participated in the rehabilitation of the irrigation system Tiznados that Chavez inaugurated in 2008 in the state of Guárico. Irrigation systems are essential tools for food production and, therefore, to ensure food sovereignty, one of the objectives set by the Bolivarian government. Nonetheless, Beijing is also involved in studies on soil quality, provision of seeds and the development of production lines of the so-called white corn. Meanwhile, Venezuela began in 2011 the import of oilseeds, pulses and grains to keep their food reserve under contract with the Heilongjiang Beidahuang State Farm Business Trade Group.

Chavez also announced that China will install in Venezuela factories of rails, sleepers, rail cars and locomotives that will be produced with iron and steel from the Andean country, in order to encourage the national rail system recovery. China finances the construction of 500 km of this network in Venezuela. Moreover, the formulation of these projects has led to the formation of different Sino-Venezuelan joint ventures in various areas, including the construction of machinery.

In the order of the infrastructures, the priorities, in addition to the railways, are focused on telecommunications. Technical cooperation covers from the optical fiber to the manufacture of mobile phones in Venezuela, but the most notable fact has been the manufacturing, building and launching of the first artificial satellite of Venezuela, the Venesat I or Simon Bolivar under an agreement between the two governments signed in 2005. The satellite was launched into space on October 29, 2008 from the Xichang Centre in south China. Since January 2009, Venezuela directly controls the satellite. It is expected that a second satellite will be launched in 2013, this time built with Venezuelan labor and technical assistance from China.

Beijing supports the development of a technology park that will allow Venezuela to build small satellites and bring the Internet, mobile telephony and cable to almost all households at affordable prices. Venezuelan technicians are trained in this area in China.

On the other hand, Vetelca, the state communications company, in cooperation with the Chinese telecommunications company manufactured the ZTE C366 mobile phones at a price of about US\$ 14 dollars. The project engineers received training of Chinese staff.

In April 2004 the Letter of Intent signed between the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Light Industries and Trade of Venezuela with the company Lanchao Group Co. Ltd of the People's Republic of China, to establish the Venezuelan joint venture company Industry Technology (VIT), assem-



bly-oriented computers. The technology transfer from China allowed technicians in this country to move to their facilities to become familiar with the production process until the Venezuelan technicians were able to carry out the full operation of the company.

Venezuela and Haier Electrical Appliances Corp. Ltd. China pledged in May 2010 to establish an appliance factory with technology transfer from China and also to import appliances placed the Venezuelan government in the Venezuelan market through its popular distribution networks.

In the month of June 2009 the first China-Venezuela industrial exhibition was held in Caracas, aiming to expand mutual understanding and strengthen the foundations of cooperation that craves to be extended to other groups and sectors.

On the economic front, because everything seems to smile at the Sino-Venezuelan cooperation, with a gradual diversification of contents and actors, while maintaining the energy body and agriculture as the backbones of their shared interest in its strengthening and development, their relationship continues to grow.

Moreover, in the financial order, cooperation began in 2010. Projects managed in yuan are estimated at about twenty, and it exits the political will to gradually increase that number. The signing of a financing plan between the Venezuelan government and the China Development Bank (CDB) contextualize the relationship. Both countries decided to create earlier this decade, a joint financing fund to finance projects in Venezuela with US\$ 4000 million dollars provided by China and Venezuela providing US\$ 2000 million dollars. In February 2009, during the Vice President Xi Jinping's visit to Venezuela, the fund was expanded in other US\$ 6 billion additional dollars, which, according to Caracas, will provide secure funding to undertake development projects and to keep the economy growing despite the global financial crisis [12]. In August 2012, both governments decided a new contribution to the financing fund, US\$ 6000 million dollars. The Bank of Economic and Social Development of Venezuela (BANDES), a state agency committed to building a bilateral social and productive development platform, manage the fund. And now it reached the figure of US \$ 12000 million dollars. The China's contribution to projects in Venezuela reached the figure of US\$ 32 billion dollars [5].

The US\$ 4 billion dollars that brought Venezuela to the fund were actually funded by China through the BDC. The four-party agreement and the financing include the delivery mechanisms of oil that constitutes the debt payments that is to be hired. Thus, Venezuela (PDVSA) sends oil (not less than 200 thousand barrels per day) to China (CNPC), which will pay into an account of the BANDES that has created the BDC in China, namely, the oil sales to China do not enter PDVSA accounts to invest in production but they remain in that country by way of repayment of debt. In this way, through the Venezuelan oil, Caracas pays the Chinese the US\$ 4 billion dollars for their share of the Fund.

A second fund was created in April 2010. China, through the BDC makes a loan to Venezuela who gets it through the BANDES. It's called the Long Term Fund and Large Volume worth US\$ 20 billion dollars,

of which US\$ 10 billion dollars must be submitted in the U.S. currency and the rest in yuan with a term of ten years. The mechanism of this fund provides that PDVSA will pay the debt owed with oil deliveries scheduled as follows: not less than 200 thousand barrels of oil per day in 2010 that then should increase in 2011 to 250,000 bpd and 300, 000 bpd later in 2012 until all obligations in the period of time are fulfilled. With the help of this fund, Venezuela has invested in about 400 projects in agriculture, industry and telecommunications, recalled the president of the National Assembly of Venezuela, Fernando Soto Rojas, on a recent visit to Beijing [16].

In 2005 the Sino-Venezuelan cooperation began in housing through an agreement between the Venezuelan Ministry of Housing and Citi Group company whose investment amounts to US\$ 905 million dollars, with which it hopes to build 20,000 houses in the state of Barinas and Caracas, specifically at Fort Tiuna. In 2011 it was agreed to build 7000 additional housing to help solve the housing crisis experienced by the Venezuelan nation and that has increased after a strong rainstorm that hit in late 2010.

In the construction of the Plains Railroad participates Engineering China Railways Corporation (CREC), working on the assembly of 468 kilometres of railway network. Additionally, it is planned the construction of a container terminal at Puerto Cabello that will allow the expansion of the port, a work that will be executed by the China Harbour Engineering and the Ministry of Transport and Communications and for which an initial investment of 600 million has been made [7].

Furthermore, in relation to transport, it is appropriate to mention that in 2010 Venezuela bought from the China Aviation Industry Corporation (AVIC) 25 aircraft intended to nurture the foundation of domestic airlines and to repower Conviasa (Venezuelan Consortium Aircraft Industries and Air Service).

### *Political Mutual Trust*

Based on the assumed belief that both are developing countries, the second axis of the Sino-Venezuelan relationship sits on the exchange of high level visits, close cooperation in international affairs based on the application of identical criteria and the coincidence in the defence of what they regard as a basic principle of international relations: non-interference in internal affairs. His foreign policy principles are part of the promotion of a multipolar world in which nations interact in a context of fair, just, egalitarian and peaceful cooperation without precedence, as required by an ideological alignment, the schemes of imperial domination, characteristic of the capitalist system.

Add to this the nationalism that both countries share and that at levels of its power structure means finding political solutions that lead to the political disagreement with those who aspire to the universal shaping following political comparable models. This circumstance makes the coincidence of points of view on multilateral fora by not endorsing and sanctioning to veto decisions that drive the Western powers, especially the U.S., reaffirming an independent foreign policy that lets them to attempt to disparege any external influence.

Diplomatic relations between China and Venezuela were established in 1974. But until the arrival of President Chávez there was only one visit to China by President Herrera Campins (in power between 1974 and 1984). In 1999, bilateral relations offered a modest balance: they had signed 19 agreements so far, of which only 2 came to effect and both related to the needs of the diplomatic and consular personnel. From 1999 to today, a total of 360 agreements were signed of which about 200 are fully operational. Venezuelan authorities speak of “explosion” of cooperation.

Between the visits of senior Chinese leaders to Venezuela during the Chavez’s mandate include: Li Ruihuan (May 2000), Jiang Zemin (April 2001), Zeng Qinghong (January 2005), Xi Jinping (February 2009). The first visit by a Chinese leader to Venezuela was ousted starring Zhao Ziyang, in November 1985. Also Li Peng as prime minister visited Venezuela in November 1996. Hu Jintao has not visited Venezuela in spite of visiting the region in 2004 (Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Cuba), 2005 (Mexico) and 2009 (Costa Rica, Cuba and Peru) [1].

Meanwhile, Hugo Chavez has visited China six times (1999, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008), the last in April 2009, meeting with Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, Xi Jinping and many senior leaders of the country, visiting different Chinese provinces and showing off his memory with quotations from Mao Zedong[2]. On October 23, 2009 he announced the creation of a “Mao fund”, with an initial capital of 100 million bolivars (US \$ 46.5 million), due to the economic interests of China-Venezuela fund. The fate of this fund is linked to social projects [10].

Political dialogue at the highest level, reinforced with the exchange of presidential visits, ministerial and technical delegations established a dense network that is gradually consolidating. Also through the promotion of all types of exchanges between parliamentary delegations, party delegations and so on.

In international affairs, bilateral cooperation is a fertile ground. China, for instance, has supported, against Guatemala (US-backed option), the application from Caracas to access a non-permanent seat on the Security Council of United Nations (2006). Venezuela did not support the convictions promoted by some countries in international forums in relation to the human rights situation in China and support the Chinese approaches in disputes such as Iran or North Korea, amidst many others. Moreover, both parties are aware that their understanding has a strong regional dimension, as it contains not only Venezuela but also Mercosur and Unasur, throughout Latin America [4].

Naturally, Caracas has joined the Chinese claim of creating an international currency to end the dollar’s hegemony, demanding the urgency to make changes in the prevailing financial system to make it more fair and inclusive. It is currently under study and experiment the use of alternative currencies in trade using own currencies.

Chavez’s proposal to expand ALBA’s relations with China, an idea launched during his visit to Beijing in September 2008 has been received with caution [11]. In this framework, the project would include the installation of a submarine cable between Caracas and Havana, with ramifications for the rest of the Car-

ibbean and Central America. The largest reservoir lies in the ideological and political connotations of the project and its belligerence, something that does not appeal to China, who reiterates active and passive, that their relationship are not based on ideology nor are directed against a third party nor have a vocation to affect other countries. China seems to escape any form of political commitment to the project led by Chávez that would connote foreign policy ideologically.

The Bolivarian socialism and the socialism with Chinese characteristics have in common the attempt to provide a national response to the demands of modernization, development and social justice. The invocations of shared ideological sources in Caracas offer a reading perhaps more committed, what for China, rooted in pragmatism, is not completely seduced from and even considered dangerous in the view of their own historical experience from Maoism.

### *Military relations*

These date back to the 1980s of last century, when both parties developed adequate defence attaché. The exchange of military delegations occurs with certain regularity. Caracas has bought in China four JYL 3-D radars to monitor its airspace (US \$ 150 million dollars) and it is likely that they would acquire new modules in the short term. Also 24 training fighters K-8 Karakorum domestically manufactured for its air force [6]. These aircrafts, built with technology acquired in Pakistan may face combat and recognition missions. According to Chavez, these acquisitions are intended to strengthen the defence capability of Venezuela to the U.S. refusal to sell them spare parts. Notwithstanding, although it may satisfy part of their armament needs in China, the Russian arms market on China's raw and it seems that the latter seeks not to excel in this area. In addition, Chinese military are participating in training activities in Venezuela, as in other countries in the region. China has participated in the last two parades on July 5, a national holiday. In the one hold in 2011, the Chinese contingent monopolized the front page of China Daily. The military industry collaboration gains weight on the bilateral agenda.

### *Other Exchanges*

The increasing intensification of exchanges and visits in the areas of culture, education and tourism is well noted. Since the agreement for cultural cooperation from 1981 to today, these relationships have evolved particularly intense. The visits of sets of opera, acrobatics, martial arts or dance and song to Venezuela are complemented by similar efforts by the other party. The exchange of students, or civil servants of the respective departments of Foreign Affairs has also been formalized. Moreover, sports exchanges are also included in the scope of their relationship with a specific plan of cooperation.

## Complex Relationships

For Venezuela, bilateral relations with China are an example of South-South cooperation and of its potential. This was stated by Chavez himself in one of his *Alo Presidente* programs (Sunday August 17, 2008) which was attended by the then Chinese Ambassador to Caracas Zhang Tuo.

In the Hu Jintao visit to Peru in November 2008, listed the range of fields in which China and Latin America could cooperate. In all these domains, there is now cooperation between Beijing and Caracas, offering the most diversified pattern of relationships and complete of all the countries of the region.

The strategic alliance between the two countries is based on the principles of planning, gradual, mutual benefit, transparency, technology, and human resources training. In developing this relationship the leading public sector has a relevant role, what adds capacity to their accurate relationship, however very dependent on political whims.

Moreover, this alliance would stage the union of two large regions in the context of a strategy to unite the world's emerging poles. To Caracas, the approach to China is part and parcel of a foreign policy with regard to other countries and regions such as Russia, Belarus, India, Africa, Middle East and the Arab world. This coordination ambitions a multipolar world without imperial hegemonies, and reserves a special significance to Venezuela as a middle power. In the geopolitical arena, Chavez is developed so perhaps debatable, but following a logical and coherent balance, for the moment, clearly favourable to Caracas, at least in economic matters and international projection.

Despite China's efforts to limit to the "pragmatic" its relations with Venezuela, the truth is that these, like those held in Cuba (and even Brazil) have an important political and strategic significance. Venezuela sees in China this political ally that can serve as a counterweight to Washington, as to who they want to reduce dependencies. Chavez has developed a manifestly proactive policy in relation to Beijing. However, politically, Beijing is careful to be drawn into anti-American proclamations of Venezuelan President keeping their distance so as not to damage the special relationship they want to keep with the U.S. In April 2009, the last time Chavez visited Beijing, the official information about his stay was distributed only once the illustrious visitor left the Chinese capital, one way to avoid becoming a speaker of their allegations against imperialism and to reduce the overall projection of his stay.

On the other hand, in strictly economic terms, the characteristics of the Venezuelan oil (heavy and expensive for the technical difficulties of refining), advises moderation to China, even taking into account the unpredictability of the decisions of Chavez, who is now in line with Beijing, in other circumstances could seriously damage their interests. China is aware of the political uncertainty that accompanies the Venezuelan institutional life. This would also explain the caution in investment because of the difficulties experienced by other countries (Japan, Spain, Mexico or Argentina). It cannot be overlooked that these relationships are an issue that faces the opposition to Chavez. This equates with the cheap Chinese goods that are of poor quality and do not perform well. The sudden changes to the policy set out in Venezuela and the insecurity

prevailing in the China business world require extreme care.

Caracas, however, aspires to raise the level of the strategic partnership and expand its content, based on the belief that China is a natural ally of Venezuela, as it was pointed out on numerous occasions its active ambassador to Beijing, Rocio Maneiro. In this sense, Caracas will make emphasis on strengthening ties in the areas of greatest strategic significance, either in defense, space-technology exchange, or political cooperation. Also, taking into account the increasing opportunities that may arise for the relation as relations between Beijing and Washington may deteriorate.

## Conclusion

It should be noted that, unlike other Latin American countries which complain about having an unequal relationship with China because it is based on the provision of commodities to the Asian giant, the case of Venezuela is different. There is a greater diversity and complexity. Many consortia have been created for local manufacturing products that otherwise could be directly sold. In late 2011, Venezuela had a portfolio of more than US \$ 25 million dollars in development projects financed by the China Development Bank (some in Chinese territory and others in Venezuela). This form of cooperation can be putting pressure on China to spread to other countries in the region benefits that Venezuela enjoys.

The political harmony, the potential and the complementarity are the main reasons that have contributed to strengthening the Sino-Venezuelan relations. Today, Venezuela is amidst the five trading partners of China in Latin America with a trade surplus. Brazil (the main challenge of China in Latin America), Mexico, Chile and Peru precede it. However of them all, Venezuela is the one offering a more balanced structure.

It is equally true that the two governments attach great importance to this relationship, especially from Venezuela. No other head of government of the region equals the number the Chavez official visits to China. On the other hand, Venezuela has natural resources that China needs (now imports more than 50 per cent of its oil) and a market of almost 30 million inhabitants with a relatively large purchasing power that is of great interest to the Asian giant. The lack of competition in the order of production, feed many expectations to develop future projects. China can contribute to Venezuela with technology, human resources and possibilities of cooperation.

Albeit in these exchanges the political factor is present, especially on the Venezuelan side, the economy is the main meeting point, which sets the direction and intensity of these relationships. Indeed, in Venezuela, China does not find the political objections that have been seen in Canada (when China wanted to acquire Noranda Minimetals) or in the U.S. (when CNOOC was able to buy UNOCAL) and can develop their business without creating any direct threat or fear preventive disincentive.

Developing economic relations with China is particularly attractive to Chavez for two main reasons. First, the rapidly industrializing China has provided a high growth economy and major financial capital en-

dowments. This is compounded by its energy needs, which could increase by 150 per cent by 2020. Caracas expects to benefit from this increase of demand. Second, the fact that China does not hold political or moral imperatives in its trade relations. China also has no history of intervention in the Western Hemisphere, and assumes no messianic vocation of advocating a particular political system. China's foreign policy promotes a stress-free environment, which considers essential to develop their businesses and investments.

For China, the relations with Venezuela are interested, primarily, on the energy dimension that complements broader agreements in other areas such as technology, agriculture, military, infrastructure, etc. It is supported primarily through loans made by China to Venezuela, which is terribly accentuated by the Chavez dependence for the support of the revolution, but it also determines and mortgages future generations because their payments are tied to future deliveries of oil [13].

For geopolitical relations Venezuela is interested not only in the market diversification but also to incorporate the ideological element of the revolution to stop the movement to achieve U.S. and Western markets its traditional customer base. These relationships also attempt to sustain the level of social spending and the gifts of the Bolivarian revolution, the backbone of this process.

China, as stated, craves energy resources and raw materials however it avoids reliance on a single partner to meet the demand. Chinese oil companies contend agreements in Africa, Central Asia, South America, and so on. Venezuela is one of its petrol partners and as in other cases, attempts to project an overall strategy. Not only imports oil but is injecting capital as direct investment in areas that are of interest and areas of interest of the Venezuelan government, providing technical advice and putting their own products.

China, on the other hand, is the key that can open the Asian energy market to the Venezuelan oil, which aspires to reduce its dependence on other markets, particularly the U.S. Chavez's threats on the blockade of U.S. crude supplies are known, though hardly deliverables: Venezuela, the largest oil exporter in Latin America, still sells 60 per cent of its crude to Washington. However, the diversification of customer base is a strategic imperative. And Beijing does not frown the diversification of its oil imports [15].

Chavez says the alliance with China has "the strength of the great wall", though the distance separating them is a major handicap for China to become the main destination of its oil. However, in the Miraflores Palace it is wanted to accelerate the pace, as noted by Chavez during his visit to China in April 2009, putting more investment, more effort and more technology.

Multilateralism and the Third World are central elements in the speech of China's diplomacy and he does not seem to want to let go despite his peculiar situation, with a global positioning is the vivid contrast of their own internal situation (one of the largest economies in the world but with strong regional imbalances). Albeit China now advocates the presence in all kinds of forums under his pragmatism, noted that dispersion of power that characterizes current international society and claiming new standards erode global unipolar power. This ubiquity allows you to advance the agenda of developing countries in all instances, leading de facto the demands of this group of states.

While the U.S. has historically been erecting a bastion of democracy and human rights, China has lacked outstanding experiences in this area, making it easier for a business partner with respect to the U.S. and Europe. His business interests take precedence over any other consideration [9].

China and Venezuela maintain a relationship of great economic incentives that becomes risky. China benefits greatly from business with Venezuela because they get access to oil and its derivatives, it is enriched by reselling their oil at prices well above the one negotiated with PDVSA, features their products in the Venezuelan market and additionally accomplished stealthily and cautious political counterbalance in the region that gives him an important reason to meet their interests.

Conceivably, Venezuela, because of oil is an important partner of China in the region. The economic and trade exchange continue to grow in the coming years. If Chavez has enough time, China's presence in Venezuela may acquire a meaning very prominent in the productive order. However, Beijing, thinking in the long term, cannot imagine this country as a lever that allows to weaken the U.S. influence as a regional power, authority and accountability to a certain extent that they recognize *de facto* [14]. However, concerns in the State Department and mutual rivalry for the significance and importance of this presence, not only in Venezuela but throughout the region will increase.

Apart from China's strategic economic interests in commodities markets and the Venezuela market, the PRC is also interested in the survival of Venezuela as a populist regime, provided that the relationship between China and Venezuela does not undermine their relationship with the United States that is more important in strategic terms. Although China's diplomacy actively trying to suggest measures to avoid any confrontation with the U.S., the Bolivarian project of the Chavez regime, for its declared hostility to Washington, strategically benefit the PRC. From the political point of view, the attempts by Chavez to challenge the dominance of the U.S., the neoliberal capitalism and the Western companies in the region create spaces in which China can improve positions and gain influence.

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## The european and chinese cooperation in the field of technology transfer

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The increase in the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) currently represents an upward trend. As a result, due to the obvious link between rapid economic growth and GHG emissions, it is necessary to examine the role that developing countries, especially the most prominent ones – such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – play in this instance. Many scholars claim that these countries will soon exceed current Western levels of emissions. GHG represents one of the main causes behind climate change (CC), which in itself constitutes a global challenge.

There are different approaches to tackling CC, with one option being the optimal use of technology. In effect, with the emergence of more efficient, sustainable and respectful new technologies, solutions can adequately be found to reverse this upward trend. However, economic, scientific and human resources are needed to develop adequate technology – all of which are often lacking in developing countries. As a basic means by which to transmit human and scientific expertise through education, academic literature or direct exchanges, the utility of the concept of technology transfer (TT) becomes apparent. Moreover, this utility is enhanced by the fact that TT is as much able to cross borders as the threat of CC is. This mobility is caused by the interaction between TT providers and recipients, such as the EU and the PRC respectively. The EU promotes and leads the fight against CC as well as promoting the use of sustainable and renewable technologies. Currently, one of the Chinese government’s top priorities is to reduce the use of coal, carbon and high-intensity energy sources.

## *EU-China cooperation on technology transfer*

The EU supports China in its domestic reform, eco-friendly economic growth and market-oriented modernisation. As a result of China's rapid economic growth, incomes have increased in conjunction with the rates of urbanisation, which have led to sharp increases in energy demands. The EU is China's top supplier of technologies and services as well as China's second most important source of high-tech products.

Cooperation in the field of science and technology (S&T) between China and Europe dates back to 1981. Thanks to the 5th Framework Programme for Research and Technological (R&T) Development (1994-2002), cooperation between the EU and China in this sector was significantly enhanced. Within this timeframe, the S&T Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1998. This agreement improved the scope and depth of research carried out between the two partners.<sup>(1)</sup> Later on, in mid- 2001, the joint EU-China S&T Cooperation Promotion Office (CECO) was created in Beijing by the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology. CECO assisted Chinese institutions and researchers seeking to participate in the Framework Programme.<sup>(2)</sup> At that time, several programmes generated new possibilities in the field of S&T, such as the Galileo satellite system, the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), and the National High R&T.

At the S&T Policy Forum in 2005, the main issues on the agenda included the deployment of low carbon technologies, the enhancement of energy efficiency, clean coal technologies, power generation and renewable energy.<sup>(3)</sup> In the following year, the China-EU Year of S&T took place. In a speech given by Commissioner Potočnik, he listed technological developments in the fields of energy, water resources and environmental protection as the main priorities to be tackled, whilst stressing the need for the implementation of R&D projects in the field of renewable energies, such as wind power, solar energy or biomass energy.<sup>(4)</sup> In November 2009, in Nanjing, the S&T Cooperation Agreement was renewed for another five-year period. One of the latest initiatives was the EU-China S&T Week. It took place during the World Expo, in June 2010, in Shanghai. The main topics discussed were CC, energy, the exchange of know-how and transport.<sup>(5)</sup>

(1) Ma Songde, 'China's International S&T Cooperation: Importance and Promise', Words of Deputy Minister of Science and Technology, China Science and Technology, Newsletter, No. 228 July 10, retrieved 18 April 2011, [http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/newsletters/2000/200411/t20041129\\_17615.htm](http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/newsletters/2000/200411/t20041129_17615.htm)

(2) 2009 China-EU Science and Technology Cooperation Promotion Web, <http://www.ceco.org.cn/about.aspx>

(3) Giulia C. Romano, 'The EU-China Partnership on Climate Change: Bilateralism Begetting Multilateralism in Promoting a Climate Change Regime?', Mercury, E-paper issue 8, December 2010, retrieved 16 April 2011, [www.mercury-fp7.net/fileadmin/user\\_upload/E-paper\\_no\\_\\_8\\_2011.pdf](http://www.mercury-fp7.net/fileadmin/user_upload/E-paper_no__8_2011.pdf), p.9.

(4) Commissioner POTOČNIK speech, Innovation: China's New National Strategy Address at the Opening Ceremony of China-EU Science and Technology Year Vice Minister WU of Science and Technology, China October 11, 2006. [ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/eu-china/pdf/vm\\_wu\\_speech\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/eu-china/pdf/vm_wu_speech_en.pdf)

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As aforementioned, China's energy demands are constantly increasing: its industry sector consumes 70% of its energy resources, whilst 70% of China's total energy consumption is dependent on coal. For this reason, the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) set targets to reduce energy intensity by 20% per unit of GDP, by 2010.<sup>(6)</sup> In parallel, the latest R&T issues are all listed as priority objectives in the 7th Framework Programme (2007–2013), which is the EU's main instrument for funding research. The Chinese government is aware that in order to upgrade the country's technology base, it will need to obtain European technological advances for sectors in which it suffers from a deficit, especially if it expects to export its own products in a globally competitive market over the long-term. This explains the reasons behind the Chinese strategy of collaborating with foreign partners on large joint-ventures in order to benefit from their technology, such as the 3G standard for Mobile telecommunications agreement signed between Datang in China and Siemens in Germany.<sup>(7)</sup>

The areas for cooperation are vast. At first, the priorities were focused on energy, biology, biomass energy, telecommunications, aeronautics and space. Of late, TT has taken a step further by embracing high-tech products and energy efficiency. Nowadays, the priority has shifted to clean energy, renewable energy and low carbon markets. All these issues require cooperation on R&D, in both the public and private sectors, in terms of innovation, legislation and international norms. Therefore, cooperation regarding TT covers a wide range of different aspects.

### *Opportunities and obstacles for bilateral cooperation*

The main purpose of the partnership is to improve ties so as to obtain more successful outcomes. Thus, in order to put forward a better conceptualisation of this cooperation, it is necessary to outline both the opportunities and obstacles to this cooperation.

On the one hand, there are obstacles due to the domestic contexts of these two respective partners, such as: insufficient legislation; low-levels of investment in R&D; lack of sufficient incentives for innovators or investors; slow diffusion processes; poorly protected intellectual property rights (IPR); European concerns over potential economic losses; the obligation for European companies to establish joint-ventures with Chinese firms; protectionism in the Chinese market; barriers to European foreign direct investment; and the quasi-absence of Chinese investments in Europe. Furthermore, bilateral cooperation is threatened by fragmented and poorly defined technology markets; the slow adoption and implementation of IPRs; the high cost of producing technologies (patents); the lack of public support (job losses); the need for suitable equipment in the recipient country; the lack of fixed national and international objectives and measures; costly and risky capacity-building; the lack of competition (premature technology selection); and the mis-

(6) EUROPA, 'EU-China research cooperation in the spotlight at World Expo Shanghai', Press Releases, 14th June 2010, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/254&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=de>

(7) Nicola Casarini, 'The evolution of the EU-China relationship: from constructive engagement to strategic partnership', occasional paper n. 64, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, October 2006, pp. 31-32

management of time and resources.

On the other hand, there exist many opportunities for this cooperation, for instance: the amelioration of R&D; flexible mechanisms for public and private sector financing; company incentives (fiscal incentives, subsidised credit and better market access); the upgrading of industrial structures; and the improvement of academic exchange programmes (working groups) between the EU and China. Moreover, there exists a multitude of possibilities for cooperation in this field, for example: via the creation of innovation centres for research; the creation of regional TT centres as a one-stop-shop; public-private partnership projects; international trade and investment on climate-friendly technologies; new cost-efficient models of technological cooperation; the stimulation of innovation via the introduction of prizes; the establishment of a TT fund to assist rewarding innovations; the creation of a micro-credit system; cost-effective portfolios to meet stabilisation targets; financial increases targeted at local capacity enhancing activities (LDCs); the restructuring of the current IPR regime (by limiting the duration of the patent protection, by a relaxation of standards or by the establishment of an overarching IPR mechanism).

In short, EU-China cooperation in the field of TT presents more opportunities than obstacles. However, the threats identified need to be rapidly addressed.

### *The impact of cooperation on the bilateral fight against climate change*

CC plays an important role in both the PRC and the EU's respective environmental security strategies. Both partners are active in multilateral processes and international forums. They have also equally signed international agreements and protocols in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. In 2005, they established a bilateral framework for cooperation on CC matters, entitled the EU-China Partnership on CC, which is supported by a Rolling Work Programme of collaborative projects.

TT is one of the most effective and well-known approaches for dealing with CC. Two methods, mitigation and adaptation, can be used to alleviate the impacts of CC. TT has been identified as one of the essential processes used for mitigating the threat of CC and the resulting environmental damage.<sup>(8)</sup> This is especially important when considering the fact that GHG mitigation and adaptation are heavily dependent on TT and the dissemination of knowledge. This is the reason why TT has been included in all CC policies, as it cannot be made separate from any policy response to GHG mitigation and adaptation.

GHG emissions and the effects of CC can be mitigated and adapted to present needs via the application of new and sustainable technology. The EU, as a leader in environmental issues, is well aware that China is one of the most important partners in the fight against CC, due to its commercial weight, its rapidly growing economy and its dependency on coal. In fact, cooperation on TT offers a real opportunity to develop clean

(8) Zili Yang, 'An analyses of technology transfer as a Zilponse to climate change', Copenhagen Consensus Center, retrieved 3 May 2011, [http://fixtheclimate.com/uploads/tx\\_templavoila/AP\\_Technology\\_Transfers\\_Yang\\_v.4.0.pdf](http://fixtheclimate.com/uploads/tx_templavoila/AP_Technology_Transfers_Yang_v.4.0.pdf), p. 3.

energy technologies as well as innovation in the field of S&T.

The scope for bilateral cooperation is very large within this framework and it has been directly influenced by the increasing environmental awareness of policymakers on both sides, who have moved rapidly to include CC risk management in their national development strategies. Nowadays, the use of efficient energy technologies constitutes a matter of national security and survival in China as much as in the EU. Furthermore, as TT is interlinked with energy and CC, sectoral approaches have broadened participation in emission reductions.

In this partnership, the need for rapid diffusion of new energy and climate technologies is stated as a crucial objective. The EU aims to assist China in its realisation of the targets set out in the Kyoto Protocol by purchasing 77% of carbon credits generated in China by 2012. In order to do so, the EU has outlined three main goals: the capture and storage of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from coal-fired power plants; the reduction in costs of key technologies; and the promotion of their deployment.<sup>(9)</sup> Thus, this bilateral cooperation aims to develop better and cheaper technologies, and to research on carbon capture and storage technology through the expanded usage of close-to-zero energy technology (for instance on low-carbon and sustainable liquid transport fuels, such as biofuels). At the same time, the Chinese government has also focused on energy efficiency and conservation, by emphasising the importance of developing its own renewable technologies in the energy sector.

China's industrial policy actively encourages the transfer of foreign technology. For this reason, the EU and the PRC have created and implemented several projects. The most positive results have emanated from the following projects and programmes: the EU-China Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Facilitation Project, the EU-China Energy and Environment Programme (EEP), the EU-China Cooperation on Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and the Switch-Asia Programme.<sup>(10)</sup> In all these projects, transfer mediums for knowledge and innovation are fundamental in order to develop Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) tools, to improve efficient energy technologies and to develop technologies for low-carbon capture. These points are crucial because currently, the technology used to reduce GHG emissions and low-carbon capture is inefficient.

Yet, despite the consensus on the need for increased TT to tackle CC, there is still no coordinated policy on TT mechanisms with China, within the Copenhagen framework. In order to obtain more specific outcomes from this cooperation, the EU is looking for TT mechanisms that are effective in dealing with the specifics of China's features. However, these obstacles subsist, due to the fact that European companies only export secondary standard environmental technology. This obstacle is caused by the fear that these companies hold towards their Chinese counterparts, whom they suspect may attempt to copy their product

(9) Lee *et al.*, *Changing Climate, Interdependencies on energy and climate security for China and Europe*, Chatham House Project, November 2007, retrieved 12 April 2011, [http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/research/eedp/current\\_projects/eu-china/](http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/research/eedp/current_projects/eu-china/), pp. 8-10.

(10) More information about them at: EU China CDM Facilitation Project Final Dissemination Conference, Summary Report, 19 November 2009; <http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/1192>; <http://www.nzec.info/en/>; <http://www.switch-asia.eu/>

without paying the cost, thus reducing their profits. In order to prevent this, European companies have acted rapidly in protecting their creations via patents, to be potentially used against fraudulent Chinese counterparts before a court of arbitration. Yet, this protection has direct implications with regards to the price of European environmental technology – the application of the patent causing the inflation of the price of environmental technology. In addition, two further obstacles remain in the energy sector: high import duties on finished energy systems and reluctance to cooperate with Chinese partners on access to energy resources.

In short, the main goal of CC policies is to reduce GHG emissions. The reduction of these emissions will affect not just a region but the entire planet. TT has a vital role to play in making CC adaptation and mitigation possible. TT cannot be made separate from energy, CC or sustainable development policies or projects, because without sharing expertise, capabilities and green technology, it is impossible to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The industry sector has a crucial role to play with regards to these emissions, as do governments in terms of promoting the use of green technology and disseminating wider information and better access of green products to consumers. Therefore, implementing TT creates a win-win outcome for both providers and recipients.

## Conclusion

The joint effort of these two partners presents, on the one hand, many strengths and opportunities, due to TT's underdeveloped nature. Despite its huge market potential, China depends on the EU's determination in matters such as the CDM, TT and capabilities reinforcement. On the other hand, there are obstacles and divergences between the PRC and the EU. On the Chinese side, the EU is expected to provide funding, investment, and cheap access to energy and technologies to reduce GHG emissions. Chinese companies have also denounced European protectionism as preventing them from learning how to use and promote these technologies. On the European side, there is an obvious fear, because of China's incredibly rapid absorption of foreign technology that IPRs are not always respected thus culminating in job losses – a fact which is not well received by Europeans in the midst of a severe economic crisis. For this reason, companies are demanding an equivalent economic compensation for the diffusion of their technology.

Finally, both regions have started to work on their domestic legislation, whilst collaborating on S&T and R&D projects. The steps taken over the last ten years demonstrate the mutual willingness to pursue this complex target. Moreover, the programmes and projects already in place – to improve the development and deployment of renewable technologies or carbon capture and storage – have been very effective. Therefore, it is ascertained that the EU and China will proceed towards a deeper and stronger collaboration in a common effort to adapt and mitigate CC. They have moved one step closer to accomplishing this goal by applying one of the most useful strategies possible, technology transfer.

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## Criminal charge for terrorism in Chinese Jurisdiction: Improvement and contradictions

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The September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks were, undoubtedly, the most socio-cultural-defining event of the century, through which the world would define a kind of global war ever experienced, the war on terror. In spite of being an American event, the terrorist attacks, not a totally new concept in International Law, reached new dimension and importance in all parts of the globe.

The necessity to establish an accurate criminal law definition and laws arose accordingly. Currently, there are 16 UN legal instruments and four additional amendments dealing with terrorism<sup>(1)</sup>, being 11 of them published after 9/11. This figure represents that the attacks to the World Trade Center were responsible to bring terrorist attacks from local events to a global threat.

There is no consensus amongst scholars and jurists about the international conceptualization of the term terrorism. The United Nations has attempted to pen a definition, without success. The Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, the latest UN document on terrorism, is in deadlock due to the lack of agreement amongst its members over the definition and detailed provisions.

The importance of a universal definition relies on the limitation to both combat and prevent terrorist crimes. For the international law, it compromises the judicial oversight and legal binding, as well as limits the United Nations to advocate as an international authority on the issue.<sup>(2)</sup>

It is regionally that more effective legal countermeasures have been put into practice. The European Union, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), The African Union had stepped forward to guarantee better international criminal legislations. In Asia, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has proven to be a successful case.

The SCO is an intergovernmental mutual-security group founded in 2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The group works as a platform to confront terrorism, extremism and separatism, or the “three evils”, all big threats to the region. Its main binding document is the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism.

(1) Terrorism was first addressed at the international level in 1937, through the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. Data from the United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism.

(2) (Human Rights Advocate)

China has been very active not only in the SCO, but also in the UN and other organizations. China has signed and ratified most of the UN Conventions and the United National Security Council Resolutions on the issue such as the UNSC resolution 1373<sup>(3)</sup>. Yet, the People's Republic has found in the Shanghai Convention on Counter-terrorism the most suitable mechanism to defend its interests in its most problematic region. Through cooperation and extradition treaties, the convention has provided important legal bases for Beijing to pledge trans-border terrorism.

By taken part into UN documents even though they are not legally binding, China reaffirms its engagement to counter international terrorism. As a responsible stakeholder and permanent member of the Security Council, China has taken positive steps towards the issue. Concerning the SCO, more specific determinants arose, such the escalation of terrorism in the borders.

## ***TERRORISM ACCORDING TO THE CHINESE LAW***

In order to ratify international documents, adjustment of national laws shall be voted in the Congress. Moreover, in Chinese jurisdiction, an international document shall not violate the terms of the Constitution, and it is common practice the implementation of domestic legislation for law enforcement accordingly. In the recent years, amendments to the Criminal Code became more common in order to adequate the terms of terrorism.

The Chinese Criminal Code from 1997 and the article 120, tackled terrorist crimes for the first time, although in a very simplistic way. The 9/11 has reminded China of the vulnerability of any country towards terrorism, the eminent necessity to amend the Criminal Law and elaborate new provisions respectively.

The Amendment of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (III) from 2001 brought about the first attempt to stipulate a prison sentence for terrorist acts, which according to the article 114, "Whoever commits arson, breaches a dike, causes explosion, spreads poisonous or radioactive substances, infectious-disease pathogens or other substances, or uses other dangerous means, thereby endangering public security but causing no serious consequences, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 3 years but not more than 10 years."<sup>(4)</sup>

The government has acted promptly to adequate its domestic legislation to the new reality since 2001, however two major criticisms were raised: the lack of defining inherent crime of terrorism and the criminal liability itself.

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(3) UN resolution 1373/2001: Suppressing, Financing, Improving International Cooperation and the creation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee.

(4) The criminal charge for leading terrorist organizations is a fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years or life imprisonment, according to the Chinese Criminal Code, article 120.

The importance of defining the terms of terrorism, as mentioned previously, has direct impact on the binding effect of the Law, imposing crucial barrier to crackdown terrorism. Since there is no organized body of legislation with clear definition, it is challenging to include terms such as religious extremism as component of terrorism. Domestically, the gap between legal understanding and legal application poses difficulty for the Judiciary to deal with terrorist cases, which in most of the cases, terrorism is not mentioned in the trial charge.

It is questionable the reasons the government avoided to apply the definition from the SCO and other articles into the Chinese legislation when the document first passed in the Congress.

The second issue, concerning criminal liability, is also controversial. Chinese Criminal Law does not independently regulate terrorist crimes, as it is presented in form of ordinary crimes<sup>(5)</sup>. “Terrorism is, by nature, a threat”<sup>(6)</sup>, which has global dimensions and cells spread in all continents. What differs terrorism from ordinary crime is the motivation and consequences; its harmfulness and impact to social stability as well as threatens to national security.<sup>(7)</sup> In rough, ordinary crimes are more of economically than politically motivation.

The Criminal Code suggests crimes of endangering State security, through which separatism is widely discussed. Terrorism, however, is found on the section of ordinary crimes. The main argument that separates separatism and terrorism in the Law relies on the fact that separatism is an old threat to China’s sovereignty as an united country with past and present hazard from North to South, Taiwan, Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang, just to name few.

Terrorism and separatism have, however, close linkage, being the second a feasible motivation of the first. Separatism refers to full political secession, seeking governmental autonomy or independence due to ethnicity and religion divergences<sup>(8)</sup>. In Chinese Criminal Law, separatist movements have no legal definition, though the legal apparatus is much broader.

Terrorism and separatism should have similar charges consequently. According to the article 103, the individual who gets involve with separatist movements shall be sentenced to life imprisonment or not less than ten years of fixed-term imprisonment; and for separatism instigation, the sentence should not be more than five years of fixed-term imprisonment, criminal detention, control, or deprivation of political rights.

As for terrorist crimes, what determines the punishment is the vehicle the individual used to reach his goal, such as arson, explosion, among others, according to the article 114. It is paramount to separate terrorist crimes from ordinary crimes and adequate the punishment to be more similar to separatist crimes.

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(5) (Chien-peng Chung, 2006)

(6) (Laura K. Donohue, 2007)

(7) It not a unanimous understanding that terrorist crimes should not be considered as ordinary crimes. The American Department Homeland Security released a report in 2012 comparing terrorism to ordinary crimes, which has been strongly criticized, and contradicts the provisions of the United States Law Code accordingly.

(8) Taiwan and Inner Mongolia are other example of ‘Chinese provinces’ that also seek independence.



Terrorism should be understood a matter of public security as well.

One real example is the Wang Bingzhang (王炳章) case back in 2003. A United States-based activist with Chinese citizenship got convicted for the crimes of espionage and terrorism. He got accused of organizing and leading a terrorist group, espionage for Taiwan, plotting bombs and building a terrorist training camp in Thailand. His trial happened in Guangdong province, Southern China, where he was convicted of terrorism with a sentence of 10 years imprisonment and life in prison for the crime of espionage, based on the article 10 of the Chinese Criminal Code.

A similar sentence was given to Huseyin Celil (侯赛因江·贾里力), a member of the East Turkestan Liberation Organization, with both Chinese and Canadian citizenships. He was found in Uzbekistan and extradited to China. He was charged in 2006 for 10 year for terrorist activities; sentenced to life over separatism and plotting to split the country<sup>(9)</sup>.

The total sentence of life imprisonment in both cases was mostly due to the crime of espionage and separatism, not to terrorism itself. In other words, terrorist crimes have been common in a form of ethnic separatism but there are other motivations such as religious extremism, political rights, among others. The main characteristic of terrorism in China is separatist or ethno-nationalist religiously motivated.

## ***POLITICAL APPROACH TO TIBET AND XINJIANG***

The raising vulnerability in Tibet and especially in Xinjiang has been the main *rationale* for raising concerns over terrorism. The Chinese government has acted in two fronts to improve counter-terrorism actions: by enacting and revising laws and by developing economic strategy; being the last one, a great initiative that goes beyond the Law.

In 2011 and 2012, the China's State Council has reached an agreement to release a more specific legislation on terrorism. The new anti-terrorist Draft bill contains legal definition of terrorist acts and terrorist organizations, as well as a list of terrorist groups that act in China. When adhered by the Criminal Code, the lack of defining inherent crime of terrorism will no longer be a barrier to law enforcement.

The Draft bill states that “terrorist acts are defined as those acts which are intended to induce public fear or to coerce state organs or international organisations by means of violence, sabotage, threats or other tactics... These acts cause or aim to cause severe harm to society by causing casualties, bringing about major economic losses, damaging public facilities or disturbing social order.”

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(9) Huseyincan Celil, Uyghur imam with Chinese and Canadian citizenships. He was arrested in Uzbekistan, then extradited to China against the approval of the Canadian government, and sentenced to life in prison on charges of terrorism. This event had negative impacts to Sino-Canadian relation because of China's refusal to extradict Huseyincan Celil to Canada, amongst other reasons.

Together with terrorist acts, terrorist organizations and terrorists have also been given attention. But what the main and crucial aspect of the draft bill concerns instigating, funding and assisting terrorist organizations, which are considered as other means of terrorist acts, subject therefore of criminal charge.

By defining specific terms of terrorism as causes as harm to the society and disturb social order, the disparity between that terrorism and ordinary crimes is reinforced. The whole body of legislation might have to be reevaluated in order to avoid further controversies.

The last but not least important information the draft bill states, concerns the need of precise list of terrorist organizations and terrorists.

Due to the worsen situation its Western territory, the Chinese government has anticipated the draft bill and identified and listed several terrorist organizations in the Uyghur community in China and Tibet: Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the World Uyghur Congress, the East Turkestan Information Center, the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan (URFET), the East Turkestan Party of Allah, the Shock Brigade of the Islamic Reformist Party, the East Turkestan Opposition Party, the Islamic Holy Warriors, the East Turkestan International Committee and the Tibet Youth Congress in Tibet<sup>(10)</sup>.

The ETIM group has ties with the Islamist organization Al-Qaeda<sup>(11)</sup>. ETIM has used religious fundamentalism to vow for the establishment of the East Turkestan as an independent country. They were responsible for hundreds of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang in the past years.

The Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement and the East Turkestan Liberation Organization were designated as terrorist groups by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security in 2003, followed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the United Nations.

The international designation of those terrorist groups, their leaders and members may contribute to the Chinese government to identify their location, freeze their assets, conduct proper criminal investigation, arrest and conduct criminal eviction domestically. This is, indeed, an effective way to counter-terrorism.

On the economical side, the “carrots and sticks” policy has been given place to a more soft approach. China has implemented preferential policies for economic development in both Tibet and Xinjiang. The government has issued tax incentives for companies that want to relocate to the region especially in the field of infrastructure, production and bases for gas, energy and oil in order to compensate for their economy reliability in the agriculture as well as the scarcity of arable land and water resources.

(10) (Zheng Yongnian & LIM Tai Wei, 2009)

(11) Al Qaeda, as a global militant Islamic organization has cells in different countries and continents, such as Africa and Asia. Al Qaeda has provided training and support to local terrorist organizations since its foundation by Osama bin Laden in 1989.

Beijing believes that by improving living standards of the region, protests and terrorist attacks will diminish. It is important to highlight, however, that the People's Republic shall not expect drastic changes in the "rebellious provinces" since the major issues with Tibet and Xinjiang are not economic driven, but the cultural, religious and ethnic disparities between the Tibetans, Uighurs and the Han Chinese (汉族).

Despite of engaging internationally in the fight to against global terrorism, the Criminal Code has shown gaps and controversies, mostly towards the lack of legal definition and criminal liability of terrorist crimes. As for the lack of definition, the government is in process of implementing a new draft bill, which brings the constitutions of terrorist acts, yet still fails to distinguish terrorism from ordinary crimes and increase the punishment.

Terrorism has emerged as a major security threat for the world and for China hence it should be distinguished from ordinary crimes. The main difference between them relies on the global threat terrorism represents, which disturbs social stability as well as threatens national and international security.

Beijing's new approach to terrorism targets terrorist groups and economic development, bringing stability to the region through boosting economic development.

The success of combating terrorism in China has direct linkage between understating the threat it imposes to the society as a whole; implementing a full legislation with criminal legal definition; clear premises and fair punishment, as well as acting pre-emptively. It is, indeed, a continuous exercise of countering terrorism in its most controversial region and globally.

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# China: El camino hacia la Restauración Capitalista

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## I. Introducción

La emergencia de la República Popular China (RPCH) como una gran fuerza dirigente de la economía mundial, se ha convertido en la última década en uno de los temas más interesantes y a la vez complejo del análisis político contemporáneo. Tal hecho, es catalogado por diversos analistas políticos y económicos como el despertar del dragón rojo en Asia o el milagro económico chino. Y es que a finales de la primera década de este milenio, China se posicionó como la segunda economía del mundo, con un PIB de 5.92 billones de dólares<sup>1</sup> desplazando a su vecino Japón, y ubicándose por debajo de los Estados Unidos de América (EE.UU.). De acuerdo con datos emitidos por el Buró Nacional de Estadísticas Chino, para el año 2006 el crecimiento económico fue de 12.7%, incrementándose en 2007 a 14.2%. No obstante, para el 2010 decreció a 10.4%<sup>2</sup>, y apreciaciones del Banco Mundial, afirman que el crecimiento económico durante el año 2012 se ubicaría en el margen de los 7.7<sup>3</sup> puntos porcentuales, evidenciando una posible desaceleración de la economía china en los próximos años.

Al respecto, consideramos que el status económico ostentado por este país en los últimos veinte años se debe a un proceso de transformaciones, que hunden sus raíces en las reformas estructurales impulsadas por Deng Xiaoping a principios de los años ochenta. Las mismas, supusieron el punto de arranque para la apertura gradual de China al mercado y su consiguiente liberalización económica, a través de una profunda reestructuración del orden político luego de la muerte de Mao Tse-Tung y la implementación de un modelo económico sin precedentes. Es así, como el análisis de la era reformista (1978-2010) y su consolidación (2001-2010), sugieren la implementación de políticas de corte capitalista en un país que adopta la vía del socialismo, y que a la postre lo construye bajo el liderazgo de un partido comunista. De allí pues, que se pongan de manifiesto, las múltiples contradicciones que caracterizan al modelo político – económico de la China actual.

Por consiguiente, hemos de analizar en la siguiente disertación, las distintas etapas que configuran la era reformista en China (preparación, inicio, debilitamiento, aceleración y consolidación), destacando previamente la importancia que tuvo la etapa de prerreformas (1949-1978) en la construcción del socialismo chino. Seguidamente, nos avocaremos a estudiar los fundamentos del Socialismo con Características Chinas, develando algunas de sus contradicciones, hasta sostener la tesis de la restauración capitalista en este país y el carácter híbrido, capitalista y burocrático que desde nuestra perspectiva define a este sistema.

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## II. La Etapa de Prerreformas y su Incidencia en la Restauración Capitalista

Denominamos etapa de prerreformas al periodo que abarca desde el triunfo de la Revolución China en el año 1948, hasta el año 1978, fecha en la que culmina el IV Plan Quinquenal, y se prepara el escenario para la implementación de las reformas, con la Política de las Cuatro Modernizaciones<sup>(2)</sup>.

Es posible considerar a esta etapa como un periodo que serviría de ensayo y fundamento para las posteriores reformas. Primeramente, porque al erigirse la Revolución China como una dictadura democrático-revolucionaria se despliegan toda una serie de cambios y nuevos arreglos institucionales, donde el Partido Comunista Chino (PCCH) se convertiría en el encargado de llevar al país hacia el desarrollo de las condiciones subjetivas necesarias para el afianzamiento del modelo marxista-leninista. En virtud de ello, el objetivo prioritario del partido, sería “Ocupar la posición de liderazgo en la Revolución Burguesa y darle curso hacia una nueva dirección (...) poner bajo su liderazgo a todas las masas trabajadoras que sufren a consecuencia del colapso del orden social chino y a las excluidas del proceso de producción, organizarlas e inculcarles la conciencia de clase y la lucha en contra de la tradicional ideología anti-revolucionaria, como también en contra de los tempranos brotes de la ideología reformista<sup>4</sup>.”

A partir de este momento, el PCCH se ha de convertir en el gran conductor del socialismo, al aglutinar dentro de sus filas a la clase trabajadora y campesina del país, con el propósito de acabar con los cimientos de la sociedad tradicional, a través de la lucha del movimiento obrero y campesino en la búsqueda de la implantación del orden socialista. El partido se convierte entonces, en la máxima autoridad del sistema político chino.

El Partido, como la expresión organizada de los intereses de la sociedad, surgirá del sector más avanzado de las masas pobres del campo y la ciudad, será quien asumirá un rol protagónico al saberse representante de éstas y tendrá la misión de dirigir al pueblo hacia una etapa de desarrollo histórico superior. Mientras tanto el gobierno, que tiene como soporte al Partido mismo, dependerá estrictamente de las decisiones de aquel y será el responsable de trasladar los objetivos y políticas de las autoridades políticas en planes y en la asignación de tareas en instrucciones<sup>5</sup>.

Es así como, la fusión entre Estado, partido y gobierno, comienza a ser un elemento característico del sistema político chino, prevaleciente hasta nuestros días. Las instancias del Estado y del gobierno se diluyen en la figura del partido, en tanto es este último, el encargado de formular las políticas (policy maker) y el gobierno el encargado de implementarlas<sup>6</sup>. En segundo lugar, el nuevo Estado que se erige de la Revolución China, pretendió inhibir la idea de mercado prevaleciente de la era nacionalista, a través de la implementación de un modelo estatista, el cual estuvo caracterizado por la presencia de una burocracia estatal que fungiría como una elite y suplantaría a la clase capitalista empresarial; el establecimiento de un sistema de coordinación que

(2) Durante la etapa de prerreformas se pueden periodizar distintas fases que comprenden el proceso de industrialización: a) Fase de Rehabilitación (1949-1952); b) Primer Plan Quinquenal (1953-1957); c) Segundo Plan Quinquenal y el Gran Salto Adelante (1958-1962); d) Periodo de Reajuste Económico (1963-1965); e) Tercer Plan Quinquenal y la Revolución Cultural (1966-1970) y f) Cuarto Plan Quinquenal (1971-1976) y la Política de las Cuatro Modernizaciones.

reemplazaría el mercado y una estructura jerárquica del Estado a la que se sobrepone un comité jerárquico del partido, donde reposa la dirección y supervisión de los gobernantes<sup>7</sup>. Esto último resulta sumamente importante, toda vez que el carácter burocrático del capitalismo chino actual, tiene su fundamento en la formación de esta burocracia estatal que a su vez suplantaba a la antigua clase capitalista.

La adopción del sistema de planificación central, puso en marcha durante el periodo de prerreformas la ejecución de los cuatro primeros planes quinquenales de la nación, luego de una fase de rehabilitación necesaria posterior a la Revolución y una fase de reajuste económico entre el segundo y tercer plan quinquenal. A grandes rasgos, el despliegue de estos planes estuvo basado en una estrategia de avance y retroceso puesto que inicialmente se impulsaron cambios graduales sin disolver de forma abrupta las estructuras tradicionales, siguiendo el plan de colectivización del campo y la creación de empresas mixtas. Es a partir del Gran Salto Adelante (GSA) (1958-1962)<sup>(3)</sup>, cuando se acelera el proceso de industrialización y se radicalizan las medidas, al suprimir la propiedad privada en el campo y la industria, con la creación de las comunas y de las empresas estatales, la sustitución de los incentivos materiales por los espirituales y la igualdad entre el trabajo manual e intelectual.

Posteriormente, con la rehabilitación política de Deng -quien había sido objeto de purga durante la Revolución Cultural-, se comienza a preparar el escenario para la aplicación de una política económica más pragmática. Los lineamientos ya estaban planteados en el documento *Questions on Accelerating the Development of Industry*, el cual fuera discutido por Deng en la Comisión Estatal de Planificación en 1975. En éste, se puso de manifiesto la necesidad de que China se expandiera comercialmente a través de la importación de tecnología avanzada proveniente de los países desarrollados. Por otra parte, habría que introducir nuevos y mejores métodos para el manejo y administración de las empresas, por lo que el Comité Central del PCCH no debía interferir en el quehacer diario de éstas, sino centrarse en la evaluación del desempeño y su calidad<sup>8</sup>. A la postre, se sostuvo que los incentivos debían ser materiales y otorgarse en función al trabajo y la productividad, por lo que debía existir una diferencia en la fijación de salarios.

En términos generales, el objetivo principal de esta época fue el de llevar a China a una etapa superior de desarrollo a través del diseño e implementación de políticas económicas derivadas de un sistema de planificación central con características propias, como la fusión entre partido, Estado y gobierno. Un balance general de los indicadores económicos<sup>(4)</sup> muestra que pese a los avances y retrocesos, los resultados obtenidos fueron positivos, toda vez que este país logró recuperarse de la situación de crisis en la que había quedado subsumido luego de la Guerra Sino-Japonesa y la Guerra Civil. No obstante, esa política de ensayo y error, trajo en sus años más críticos (GSA), la muerte de millones de personas a causa de la hambruna, y la muerte, desaparición y exilio de cientos de personas por las políticas implementadas durante la Revolución Proletaria Cultural.

(3) Un estudio realizado por Meza (2007), señala que durante el GSA, se observó una caída del ingreso nacional del -3.1%, la disminución del Valor de la Producción Agrícola en -4.4%, el Valor Bruto de la Producción Industrial a 3.8% y la Productividad en el Trabajo a -5.4%.

(4) Para 1978, el Valor Bruto de la Producción Total fue de 27.8%. Esto debido al incremento del Valor Bruto de la Producción Industrial, el cual aumentó de 69.6% en 1976 a 72.2% en 1978. En cuanto a la industria ligera, se observó una disminución de 44.2% a 43.2%, mientras que la industria pesada se incrementó de 55.8% a 56.9%.

Por lo demás, cabe destacar un elemento sumamente interesante visto durante ésta época, el cual radica en el hecho de que cuando se aplicaban políticas económicas graduales y moderadas (fase de rehabilitación y fase de reajuste económico), los resultados fueron significativamente positivos, dado el incremento en los niveles de producción agrícola e industrial, el aumento de la inversión nacional y de las condiciones de vida del pueblo chino, y estas fases supusieron la adopción de un sistema de propiedad mixto donde a la par de un régimen de propiedad comunitaria se permitía la inversión privada; mientras que en las fases donde hubo una mayor radicalización de las medidas económicas y una izquierdización de las instituciones políticas, la economía y la sociedad sufrieron grandes estragos. Situación que nos lleva a pensar que es en esta experiencia –profundizada más adelante en la fase de reformas – donde China encuentra la clave de su éxito económico de hoy en día.

Empero, hemos de hacer especial énfasis en el hecho de que durante esta etapa no ocurre un cambio sustancial en las relaciones de producción. En efecto, el nuevo Estado reproduce la condición de clase explotada de la clase trabajadora, en tanto y cuanto, se produce una separación de hecho de esta clase con respecto a los medios de producción. Esto es así, porque lo que se entendió como “propiedad social” pasa a ser controlada por una burocracia estatal y partidista, carente de mecanismos de control democráticos. En este sentido, se comienzan a engendrar dentro del propio socialismo chino las contradicciones que conllevan a la restauración capitalista más adelante.

### ***III. Las Reformas Estructurales en la RPCH***

En este apartado, nos proponemos analizar las fases que comprenden la era de reformas estructurales en la RPCH, desde su preparación en 1978, hasta lo que consideramos su consolidación a partir del año 2001. Para ello, debemos advertir el carácter estructural de las reformas, toda vez que estas han sobrepasado el campo de lo económico, siendo medidas orientadas a impulsar el desarrollo, pero sobre la base de un nuevo aparato productivo, una nueva ordenación política, social, jurídica e incluso ideológica.

La fase de preparación de la reforma (1978-1981), estuvo determinada por la necesidad de reestructurar el orden político a raíz de la muerte de Mao, lo que significaba el rompimiento definitivo del consenso alcanzado en 1949. Esto conllevó, a la reevaluación del legado maoísta y a la corrección de sus excesos, no solo a lo interno del partido, sino a nivel de la sociedad<sup>9</sup>. En el plano económico, lo central fue encontrar las alternativas que permitieran el crecimiento sin que ello implicara una ruptura abrupta con el sistema de planificación central. Para ello, fue imperativo lograr una alianza entre los sectores “moderados” y “reformistas” del partido, a fin de debilitar el liderazgo de Hua Guofen y establecer un plan de reformas a través de la



aplicación de medidas graduales, sectoriales y experimentales.

En efecto, las reformas debían emprenderse bajo dichas cualidades por varias razones a saber: 1) Con la adopción de un sistema gradual no se rompería abruptamente con el pasado, a la vez que se permitiría evaluar poco a poco los límites y los alcances de las nuevas medidas económicas adoptadas ; 2) La gradualidad favorecería a que el sistema económico no colapsara, dado que por muchos años éste estuvo sometido a un fuerte proteccionismo por parte del Estado y no estaban aún las condiciones dadas para competir abiertamente; 3) Al desarrollarse las nuevas políticas en espacios geográficos bien delimitados, se podrían evaluar sus resultados y al probar su éxito, ser implementadas en otras áreas del país. Al respecto, afirma Bustelo que el carácter “(...) experimentador y gradualista de la estrategia de reforma económica, (...) ha permitido evitar desequilibrios inherentes a las opciones, más radicales, de otros países en transición. Los cambios se experimentaron en principio a pequeña escala y, solo cuando se comprobó que tenían efectos positivos, fueron extendidos a áreas geográficas más amplias o a otros sectores económicos”<sup>10</sup>.

En ese sentido, el XII Congreso del PCCH celebrado en 1982, representa no solo el inicio de las reformas, sino un punto de inflexión, puesto que en él, se aceptan las líneas reformistas propuestas por Deng y que en lo sucesivo habrían de llevarse a cabo. Las mismas fueron expuestas por él, en las palabras de apertura del Congreso:

La década de los ochenta constituye un importante período de desarrollo de la historia de nuestro partido y de nuestro país (...) Durante un largo período venidero, por lo menos en las dos décadas que restan hasta fines del presente siglo, debemos empeñarnos en las siguientes cuatro tareas: efectuar la reforma de los organismos y la de las estructuras orgánicas de la economía y revolucionar el contingente de cuadros, rejuvenecerlo, dotarlo de conocimientos culturales y capacitarlo profesionalmente; fomentar la civilización socialista en lo espiritual; asestar duros golpes a las actividades delictivas antisocialistas que se cometen en el campo económico y en otros dominios y rectificar el estilo del partido y consolidar sus organizaciones sobre la base de un estudio concienzudo de los nuevos estatutos del partido<sup>11</sup>.

Con la adopción de una nueva Constitución en 1982, se crea todo un nuevo marco jurídico que permite el despliegue de las reformas y el triunfo de la facción reformista del partido. Un aspecto importante de la nueva Constitución gira en torno al rol del PCCH. En las tres anteriores constituciones había quedado establecido que el partido era “(...) el núcleo dirigente de todo el pueblo chino. La clase obrera ejerce su dirección sobre el Estado a través de su destacamento de vanguardia; es decir, el Partido Comunista Chino”<sup>12</sup>. Dicha disposición estaba contemplada en el artículo 2 de la Constitución de 1978, no obstante, en la Constitución de 1982, la misma es omitida y se sustituye por lo siguiente: “todo el poder en la República Popular China pertenece al pueblo. Los órganos por medio de los cuales el pueblo ejerce el poder estatal son la Asamblea Popular Nacional y las asambleas populares locales de los diversos niveles”<sup>13</sup>.

A nuestro juicio, con esto se pretendía establecer de derecho una separación entre el partido y el gobierno. Sin embargo, dicha situación resulta ambigua, toda vez que en el preámbulo de la nueva Constitución se consagraría la supremacía histórica y venidera del partido dentro de la sociedad, a pesar de que en el articu-

lado no se le atribuyeran funciones específicas al partido como si se hizo en las Constituciones anteriores. Así, el preámbulo de la Constitución de 1982 reza que: “Bajo la dirección del Partido Comunista de China y orientándose por el marxismo-leninismo y el pensamiento de Mao Zedong, el pueblo chino seguirá persistiendo en la dictadura democrático popular y en el camino socialista, perfeccionando sin cesar los diversos sistemas específicos del socialismo, desarrollando la democracia socialista y reforzando la legalidad socialista”<sup>14</sup>.

Por lo anteriormente expuesto, consideramos que en el caso de China resulta inadmisibile la separación entre partido y gobierno. Tal como lo hemos sostenido anteriormente, hay una clara fusión entre partido, Estado y gobierno, en donde las instancias del Estado y del gobierno parecen diluirse en la figura del partido. Ciertamente, el partido domina al Estado a la vez que los funcionarios del gobierno son miembros del partido.

El Estado de democracia popular o de dictadura proletaria que es la República Popular China es en todo una creación jurídica del Partido Comunista Chino. Oficialmente, los órganos del Estado siguen siendo distintos de los del partido: es decir, se establece la separación de Estado y Partido. Pero, de hecho, el partido afirma su control sobre los órganos por el paralelismo de las instituciones políticas y de partido. Aún más, el partido puede finalmente imponer, en nombre de las masas, su voluntad al Estado. En una palabra se puede concluir diciendo que: “Ninguna cuestión política o administrativa de importancia será resuelta por ningún organismo del Estado sin consultar al Partido”<sup>15</sup>.

Ahora bien, en esta nueva Constitución, se consagró además que la base del sistema económico de la RPCCH es la propiedad pública socialista de los medios de producción (artículo sexto), no obstante, permite la iniciativa privada bajo la regulación del Estado. Por esto, el décimo primer artículo de la Constitución estipula que: “El Estado permite que la propiedad privada exista y se desarrolle dentro de los límites prescritos por la Ley. El sector privado de la economía es un complemento de la economía pública socialista. El Estado protege los derechos e intereses legítimos del sector privado de la economía, y ejerce la guía, la supervisión y el control sobre el sector privado de la economía”<sup>16</sup>.

Con ello, se establece el carácter híbrido del modelo, puesto que la adopción de un sistema de mercado, no resultó excluyente, sino por el contrario, complementaria al sistema de planificación central. Dicha afirmación queda vista en el artículo quince de la Constitución el cual sostiene que: “El Estado practica la economía planificada sobre la base de la propiedad pública socialista. Garantiza un desarrollo proporcional y armonioso de la economía nacional a través del equilibrio integral de los planes económicos y la acción coadyuvante de la regulación mediante el mercado”<sup>17</sup>. La descolectivización del campo, el establecimiento del sistema de responsabilidad contractual en la industria, un régimen de precios duales y la creación de las

Zonas Económicas Especiales (ZEE), son solo algunas de las medidas en esta etapa de la reforma que ponen de manifiesto el carácter reconciliable de la planificación con el mercado.

Sin embargo, dicho carácter híbrido conllevó a la toma de medidas ambiguas, que si bien es cierto trajeron aparejado consigo un considerable crecimiento económico<sup>(5)</sup>, también ocasionaron una fuerte inflación y revueltas sociales (Masacre de Tiananmen) que atentaron contra la hegemonía del PCCH y cuestionaron la viabilidad de las reformas. Es así, como la reforma atraviesa por un periodo de debilitamiento durante los años 1989 a 1991, que reveló las ambigüedades del sistema. Entre ellas destaca, la no separación efectiva entre los derechos de administración y los derechos de propiedad, sobre todo en las empresas. Así pues, se emprende una fase de rectificación económica que restablece el carácter central de la economía, fortalece los mecanismos de planificación y concede políticas preferenciales a las industrias del Estado, con la intención de disminuir el crecimiento fuera del plan y controlar el crecimiento del mercado. Sin duda alguna, este fue un retroceso necesario que daría impulso a la implementación del modelo de Economía Socialista de Mercado en 1992.

### *III.I. La Economía Socialista de Mercado y las Reformas de la Década de los Noventa*

El XIV Congreso del PCCH celebrado en 1992, fue el escenario propicio para la adopción de la economía socialista de mercado. En éste, se plantearía que el mercado sería un factor fundamental en la asignación de recursos, así como un mecanismo que coadyuvaría al control de la actividad económica. En consecuencia, lo que vendría a determinar el carácter socialista del modelo sería el régimen de propiedad dominante, el cual en este caso, debía ser la propiedad pública como lo principal y la privada como secundaria. Al tener este principio definido, las siguientes acciones estarían encaminadas a: 1) El remplazo del sistema dual de precios por un sistema basado en el mercado, esto es, permitir que los precios de los artículos de consumo y los bienes de servicio se regulasen a través de la fluctuación entre la oferta y la demanda; 2) El establecimiento de un nuevo balance entre centralización y descentralización, por medio de un nuevo esquema de organización entre la autoridad central y la local, basado en la apertura de ésta última a la competencia económica; 3) Fortalecer el rol dirigente del PCCH, para lo que el Estado seguiría resguardando su autoridad en lo que respecta a la orientación y dirección del mercado reforzando al partido; 4) La promoción de una mayor autonomía e impulso hacia un sistema de empresas moderno, donde las empresas públicas se desempeñasen bajo los esquemas del mercado y por ende bajo competencia que las haga más eficientes; 5) Profundizar el proceso de apertura al exterior, con la finalidad de integrarse al sistema de mercado internacional y 6) Extender las políticas preferenciales hacia las regiones del interior de China, con la creación de Ciudades Abiertas del Interior, las Zonas de Cooperación Económica y las Zonas de Desarrollo de Alta Tecnología<sup>18</sup>.

(5) De acuerdo con Meza (2007) durante el periodo 1980-1983 la producción industrial rural se incrementó de 67.6 mil millones de Yuanes a 101.7, lo cual implicó una tasa de crecimiento anual de este sector del 13.5% a 19.12%. Por su parte, las Empresas Colectivas y de los Poblados y Villas (ECPV) experimentaron un crecimiento exponencial, siendo que para 1978 solo representaban el 9% de la producción industrial del país y para 1988 el 19.4%. Las ZEE, en particular las de la Provincia de Guangdong incrementaron su participación en la Inversión Extranjera Directa (IED) en relación al Producto Interno Bruto (PIB) de 0,7% en 1979 a 33% en 1984.

La ejecución de estas medidas suponía la eliminación del sistema de planificación central como el mecanismo idóneo para la asignación de recursos. Sin embargo, consideramos que ciertos elementos del sistema prevalecen durante esta época e incluso la actual, y es lo que precisamente le imprime el carácter híbrido al modelo. Siendo que pese a la disposición de someter a la economía a los mecanismos del mercado, sigue existiendo una autoridad central sobre la cual se concentran las decisiones de cómo operará ese mercado y cuál será su organización y orientación.

Bajo estos lineamientos, se dan las reformas de la década de los noventa, en los sistemas fiscal, financiero, industrial y de la inversión extranjera. De allí pues, que en el ámbito fiscal se implementara a partir del año 1994, un programa de reforma que tuvo como objetivo aumentar la capacidad recaudatoria del Estado a través de la eliminación del sistema de responsabilidad contractual. Las reformas en el sector financiero, estuvieron centradas en la creación de tres bancos especializados a fin de resolver el problema de los préstamos impagados que habían logrado cargar al sistema bancario público de deudas contraídas por las empresas estatales. Seguidamente, se permitió a mediados de los noventa privatizar parcialmente a bancos comerciales pequeños, los Bancos de Capital Mixto y las Cooperativas de Crédito de carácter local.

Por su parte, las reformas en el sector industrial revisten especial importancia, dadas las modificaciones practicadas en el ámbito empresarial. En lo que respecta a la Empresas Propiedad del Estado (EPE), se emprende un proyecto que pretendía transformar a las empresas estatales en un sistema empresarial moderno a través de su reducción (“Amarrar a las grandes, dejar ir a los pequeños”), basado en una clara diferenciación entre los derechos de administración y control, para lo que era necesaria la separación entre la administración del gobierno y la de las empresas. De esta manera, la responsabilidad de su funcionamiento recaía sobre una Junta Directiva que representaba los intereses de los propietarios y actuaría con cierta autonomía frente a la junta supervisora que ejerce una función contralora<sup>(6)</sup>.

En cuanto a las empresas de propiedad no estatal (Empresas Colectivas y de los Poblados y Villas, empresas privadas y empresas de capital extranjero), se dio una mejor definición de los derechos de propiedad sobre la base de la economía de mercado, a raíz del reconocimiento de la importancia de la propiedad privada en la enmienda constitucional de 1999, y la equiparación del trato de éstas con respecto a las EPE. Para el año 1996, la contribución de las empresas estatales fue de 28,5%, mientras que la de las colectivas fue de 39,4%, las individuales de 15,5% y las extranjeras de 16,6%<sup>19</sup>. Hecho que devela una seria contradicción del modelo de economía socialista de mercado, puesto a que el crecimiento económico se sustenta principalmente en el sector no público.

La Inversión Extranjera también fue uno de los temas centrales de la reforma, toda vez que las autoridades gubernamentales aplicarán una política orientada a la dirección de la inversión extranjera hacia los sectores que consideraba prioritarios para el cumplimiento de los objetivos económicos del país. De allí, que en 1995 se estableciera una Guía para la Inversión Extranjera de Empresas por medio de la cual los proyectos de

(6) A pesar de la creación de las figuras de Junta Directiva y Junta Supervisora, la burocracia gubernamental seguía teniendo un rol decisivo en ambas, por lo que no se hace efectiva la separación entre la administración del gobierno y de las empresas.

inversión se calificaban en distintas categorías a saber: Empresas alentadas, permitidas, restringidas y prohibidas; cada una normada con políticas específicas<sup>(7)</sup>.

Habida cuenta, la adopción del modelo de economía socialista de mercado supuso entre otras cosas, el remplazo del sistema dual de precios por un sistema basado en el mercado, el establecimiento de un nuevo balance entre centralización y descentralización del poder, una mayor autonomía para el sector empresarial estatal y la profundización de la apertura comercial al exterior. No obstante, no supuso el fin del liderazgo del PCCH, ni la adopción de una forma exclusiva de propiedad, ni el abandono total del sistema de planificación central, ni mucho menos, la adopción de un régimen político democrático. Todos estos cambios propiciaron el gran milagro económico chino de los noventa. Sin embargo, algo faltaba para que China pudiera integrarse completamente al mercado internacional y esto era su ingreso a la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC).

### *III.II. El Ingreso de China a la OMC*

El ingreso de China a esta organización en el año 2001, constituye la apertura definitiva de este país hacia el mundo y el establecimiento de relaciones comerciales basadas en los parámetros del libre mercado. Con ello, China pasa a ser parte integral del sistema capitalista mundial contemporáneo, a la vez que evidencia la máxima expresión de la restauración capitalista en ese país. Es por ello, que nos atrevemos a aseverar que el ingreso de China a la OMC resulta ser un punto de inflexión en el proceso de restauración capitalista a la vez que denota la consolidación de las reformas y del capitalismo con características chinas.

Luego de la aceptación del Protocolo de Adhesión el 11 de noviembre de 2001, China debía comprometerse a resolver las trabas que aún su sistema económico imponían al libre comercio. En virtud de ello, China se obligaba entre otras cosas a suplir gradualmente los contingentes o restricciones cuantitativas por aranceles “ad valorem”; proveer las mismas condiciones a todas las mercancías que ingresaran a China, sin distinguir en razón de su origen; eliminar todos los programas de subvenciones que estén contemplados en el artículo 3 del Acuerdo sobre Subvenciones y Medidas Compensatorias (SMC); reconocer el “dumping” como condenable cuando éste cause o amenace causar un daño importante a una rama de producción de una parte contratante, o si retrasa de manera importante la creación de una rama de producción, y proteger la propiedad industrial e intelectual, a la vez que aplicar los principios de libre comercio que defiende la OMC a través de una reforma de las leyes de inversiones extranjeras y de la Ley de Patentes y Marcas<sup>20</sup>.

Fueron distintos los motivos e intereses que hicieron a China persistir en su camino de regreso a la OMC. Su presencia en el comercio internacional a partir de las reformas de 1982, provocó que muchos países colocasen medidas proteccionistas a fin de disminuir la presencia de productos chinos en sus mercados nacionales y que estos pudieran afectar el mercado interno. Por tanto:

(7) De acuerdo con Meza (2007) durante esta etapa se observa un aumento en la participación de las empresas extranjeras en las exportaciones, incrementándose de un 29% en el año 1994 a 48% en el año 2000. Aunado a ello, estos cambios permitieron que las exportaciones totales de China incrementaran su participación con respecto a las exportaciones totales del mundo de un 2,3% a un 3,4% entre 1992 y 1998; sobre lo cual las empresas extranjeras eran responsables del 1.5%.

La OMC ofrecía a China un marco estable para seguir explotando sus estrechos vínculos de comercio e inversión con el resto del mundo, ofreciendo a la vez garantías al gobierno chino para abrir sus mercados con ciertas contrapartidas (esencialmente en textil y manufacturas ligeras) así como a los agentes económicos externos para que participaran activamente en la conclusión de las grandes reformas iniciadas por China años atrás – mediante la cesión de nueva tecnología, la inversión en sectores punteros e intensivos en capital e incluso la compra de deuda pública y acciones de empresas chinas<sup>21</sup>.

Desde el punto de vista político, el ingreso a la OMC sirvió para apaciguar las confrontaciones gubernamentales entre quienes estaban a favor de la apertura económica y sus detractores. Y es que, los compromisos adquiridos con la OMC, se hicieron ver como obligaciones impuestas desde afuera, que posiblemente no hubiera podido alcanzar el gobierno chino por la oposición de grupos de presión o por las administraciones inferiores. En este sentido, la profundización de la reforma a través del ingreso de China a la OMC, permitió al gobierno reducir los costos políticos que la misma traería consigo, mediante la estrategia de hacer ver a los contrarios, que la reforma y por consiguiente la apertura, era una cuestión impuesta desde afuera y no una medida del gobierno nacional.

Como consecuencia de la adhesión, China en el 2002, había aumentado su IED en un 33,5% respecto del año anterior y las inversiones extranjeras contractuales, vinculadas a proyectos futuros en un 48%<sup>22</sup>. Para el 2007, China arrojó un superávit superior en un 47% con respecto al año anterior y las exportaciones aumentaron en un 25% y las importaciones en un 20%<sup>23</sup>.

### ***III.III. Balance y Perspectivas de la Reforma***

Lo estudiado hasta aquí, nos permite afirmar que el proceso de reformas emprendido hace más de treinta años ha estado caracterizado principalmente por el gradualismo y la experimentación, puesto que la implementación de los cambios no se ha dado de forma radical sino paulatina. A diferencia de las transiciones de los países de economía planificada de Europa Central o de la misma Unión de Republicas Socialistas Soviéticas (URSS), la reforma china no se dio bajo el modelo de terapia de choque o big-bang, y ello fue posible gracias a determinados factores estructurales, tales como, la estabilidad macroeconómica, menores sesgos heredados del sistema de planificación central, un comercio exterior orientado a la economía de mercado, y una privilegiada situación geográfica, que combinados con el gradualismo coadyuvaron al éxito de la reforma<sup>24</sup>. A esto habría de añadirse el autoritarismo de un solo partido, pues consideramos que el milagro económico chino no hubiese sido posible sin que antes de la apertura se empleara el sistema de planificación central, que aún después de adoptado el modelo de mercado; la economía china resultara ser un sistema de economía de mercado con atenuados elementos del sistema de planificación central; y esto se debe principalmente al mantenimiento en el poder del PCCH que deliberadamente ha llevado las riendas de la economía controlando sus sectores estratégicos.

Otra de las características de este proceso, lo es la ruptura con el paradigma socialista tradicional. Desde los inicios de la reforma las medidas que se han tomado – más allá de la justificación teórica y práctica que

se le de en el momento, sugiriendo que son adaptaciones del socialismo a un momento histórico particular- han hecho mella de los preceptos del socialismo tradicional, toda vez que suelen estar alineados con mecanismos del sistema capitalista. Efectivamente, la figura del plan debe convivir con un mercado cada vez mas omnipotente, por lo que el papel del Estado se ha limitado a la asignación de recursos, a las políticas de precios, reservándose la planificación para lo estratégico, lo macroeconómico y lo político.

En todo caso, un balance de las reformas nos indica que sus resultados han sido exitosos. China es hoy en día la segunda economía del mundo, con un crecimiento económico impresionante, aparentemente estable y rápido en comparación con otras experiencias. Al respecto, son varios los indicadores macroeconómicos que evidencian los resultados de la reforma. En primer lugar el crecimiento económico. Antes de la reforma el crecimiento anual del PIB era inferior al 5%, posteriormente se elevó a 10.2% entre 1980 y 1990 y al 12% en 1995, hasta ubicarse en el 2010 a 10.4%. El aumento del Producto Nacional Bruto (PNB) por habitante fue de 8.7% entre 1981 y 1991 y de 10.4% entre 1991 y 1995. El PIB per cápita se incrementó de los 6.500 dólares en 2009 a los 7.500 dólares en 2010. La cuota de China en el PIB mundial en 2003 fue del 13% en comparación al 11% del resto de Asia<sup>25</sup>.

Seguidamente, las transformaciones estructurales. Entre 1980 y 1997, la proporción del sector primario en el PIB disminuyó de 30.1% a 18.2%, en beneficio del sector secundario que se incrementó de 48.5% a 49.1% y del sector terciario que pasó de 21.5% a 32.7%. Por su parte, las empresas estatales que suponían más de las tres cuartas partes de la producción del sector industrial pasaron a representar en 1992 menos de la mitad, en virtud del aumento de las ECVP y de las empresas privadas. Aunado a ello, la cuota de China en el mercado mundial se incrementó del 0,6% en 1977 al 2% en 1992 <sup>26</sup>.

Finalmente, algunos indicadores de desarrollo humano nos permiten evaluar el nivel de calidad y condiciones de vida de la población. La esperanza de vida se incrementó de 67 años en 1981 a 73 años en 2010. El analfabetismo en los adultos se redujo de 31% en 1980 a 19% en 1995 y en 2009 la tasa de alfabetismo se ubicó en 93.3%. El índice de desarrollo humano aumentó de 0,475 en 1980 a 0,687 en 2010, ubicando a China como un país con índice de desarrollo medio. En lo que respecta al empleo, la creación de puestos de trabajo ha aumentado desde la reforma, entre 1986 y 1988 a 3% y en el 2010 a 4%. No obstante, las cifras oficiales sostienen que el nivel de desempleo es de 3% el cual abarca el número de parados que se han registrado pero, se estima que el numero real oscila entre el 7% y 10%<sup>27</sup>.

Empero, la contracara de este proceso reside en los costos que ese crecimiento ha traído consigo: Desigualdad en la distribución de la renta, desigualdad entre el desarrollo de las regiones, desempleo, éxodo rural, pobreza, deterioro medioambiental entre otros. No en vano, todas ellas, expresiones de la Ley del Desarrollo Desigual y Combinado, en tanto tesis definitoria del modo de producción capitalista. Por solo mencionar algunas, en el año 2012, el coeficiente Gini llegó a 0,474, un poco más del nivel de advertencia que establece la Organización de Naciones Unidas de 0,4<sup>28</sup>. El desempleo también se constituye como otro de los grandes costos de la reforma. La tasa de paro esta próxima al 9% lo que significa mas de 17 millones de trabajadores desempleados. Esto agrava la situación de pobreza, aunque las estadísticas oficiales señalen que el número de pobres pasó del 28% de la población en 1978 al 3% de la población en 1999<sup>29</sup>. Paradójica-

mente, este régimen socialista carece de un sistema moderno de seguridad social, ya que tradicionalmente las empresas estatales se encargaban de la cobertura de sus empleados y su reducción ha dejado desprovistos de protección social a millones de trabajadores. Por último, se sostiene que una de las grandes contradicciones del modo de producción capitalista es el aumento de la producción a costa de la destrucción del medio ambiente<sup>30</sup>, pero siendo China un régimen socialista, su reforma económica le ha costado un gran deterioro medioambiental gracias al acelerado crecimiento económico, la urbanización, la industrialización rural, y el aumento de las redes de transporte.

#### *IV. ¿Economía Socialista de Mercado o Capitalismo con Características Chinas?*

Desde los inicios de la reforma han sido varias las etapas por las cuales China ha transitado en miras a consolidar su desarrollo económico. La configuración de cada una de esas etapas ha obedecido sin duda, al contexto histórico en la cual se han desplegado, y a las condiciones económicas, políticas e institucionales de la época. De allí pues, que en el caso de China, no podamos hablar de un modelo de crecimiento económico estático sino de uno que con el devenir de los años y a la par de las transformaciones dadas, se ha venido reinventando hasta convertir a China en un país moderno, “desarrollado” y vigorosamente posicionado a nivel internacional.

Así pues, desde el seno de la dirigencia del PCCH, ha habido el empeño histórico de teorizar cada uno de los modelos económicos que a lo largo del camino de las reformas se han ido implementando. El partido se ha propuesto desarrollar en cada una de las fases todo un constructo teórico que procure ir cónsono a la ideología del partido y en última instancia a los preceptos rescatados del maoísmo y del marxismo – leninismo. Partiendo desde el sistema de planificación central, a uno donde el principio fundamental es “*La economía planificada como lo principal y el mercado que juega un papel regulador como lo secundario*”, a otro que prioriza a “*La Economía Mercantil Planificada sobre la Base de la Propiedad Pública*”, hacia una “*Economía Socialista de Mercado*” en los años noventa; sintetiza en la actualidad lo que conocemos como el “*Socialismo con Características Chinas*”. Todos ellos, no han sido más que modelos ideados con el objeto de recoger los principios que han dirigido el proceso de reformas, a la par de justificar ideológicamente la apertura de este país a la economía de mercado.

Como fue expuesto anteriormente, la concepción de economía socialista de mercado prioriza y a su vez establece como rasgo definitorio del sistema, a la propiedad pública de los medios de producción; principio que concuerda con los postulados del socialismo. A saber de Xiaoqin, “el Manifiesto Comunista resume al socialismo científico en una oración: Abolir la propiedad privada de los medios de producción. Solo el cambio de la propiedad de los medios de producción de privados a públicos, hace posible abolir las clases y la explotación y lograr la riqueza común”<sup>31</sup>. Sin embargo, el modelo de economía socialista de mercado no concibe a la propiedad pública como el único régimen de propiedad aplicable y amparado en la Constitución. Ciertamente, el sistema permite que en conjunto a la propiedad pública se desarrollen otras formas de propiedad, siempre y cuando estas coadyuven al beneficio público y se encuentren bajo los lineamientos



del Estado<sup>(8)</sup>. Esto quiere decir, que aunque la propiedad pública sea consagrada como la principal, hay protección jurídica a la iniciativa privada, y además dicha protección es lo que asegura que los mecanismos del mercado puedan desarrollarse en esta sociedad, donde la iniciativa privada es la que contribuye mayoritariamente al incremento del PIB y al crecimiento económico.

En virtud de lo anterior, cabe preguntarse ¿Hasta qué punto la propiedad pública se constituye como el régimen de propiedad imperante en la China de hoy? Según un estudio realizado por Ríos, basado en cifras oficiales “el sector no público produce actualmente el 67% del PIB de China y contribuye con cerca del 80% al crecimiento económico del país. El número de pequeñas y medianas empresas registradas supera los 4,3 millones, y generan el 58,5 por ciento del PIB. Más del 95 por ciento son de propiedad personal (...) Quedan en China unas 119.000 empresas del Estado, de las que 155 son gestionadas directamente por el gobierno central...”<sup>32</sup>. Por otra parte, señala Xiaoqin, que bajo la influencia de las ideas neoliberales en China se ha propiciado en debilitamiento de la propiedad pública, y el rápido crecimiento de la propiedad privada en los años recientes. Es así como, “en el total de los activos sociales, la proporción de la propiedad pública declinó del 48.8% en 2005 al 44.4% en 2006, contabilizando el 32.1% del sector de propiedad estatal y el 13.3% de la propiedad colectiva. Por su parte, la proporción de los activos del sector no público se incrementó de 50.9% en 2005 a 55.4% en 2006, contabilizando el 31.6% del sector privado doméstico, el 20.8% del sector extranjero y el 3% de la propiedad individual”<sup>33</sup>. Con los datos anteriormente esbozados, se devela una de las principales contradicciones del socialismo chino, toda vez que la superioridad del socialismo descansa en la propiedad pública de los medios de producción. Nos encontramos entonces, frente a una China cuyos medios de producción yacen principalmente en manos de propietarios privados y a la postre en un sector que determina el crecimiento económico de este país.

Por otra parte, la implementación de un sistema de mercado en China no presupone el abandono total del sistema de planificación central, ni mucho menos el fin del liderazgo del PCCH. Como bien es sabido, a pesar de que la economía china se plantea como economía de mercado, el alcance de la planificación es aun amplio, esto se debe en parte a que los dirigentes creen todavía en la importancia de la planificación y aún más porque la estructura burocrática de la planificación aún persiste. El sociólogo español Manuel Castells ha afirmado que el papel principal del sistema de planificación central es el de “(...) subvencionar a un sector estatal improductivo y asegurar una recaudación de ingresos suficiente para cubrir las prioridades del centro”<sup>34</sup>.

Ahora bien, en el reporte mostrado por el Presidente Hu Jintao en el XVII Congreso del PCCH en el año 2007, se habló acerca de la combinación del socialismo con la economía de mercado. Sostuvo que “un sistema económico se encuentra determinado por las relaciones de producción, especialmente por la propiedad de los medios de producción. En nuestro primer estadio del socialismo, los medios de producción están bajo la propiedad pública, mientras distintos sectores de la economía se desarrollan conjuntamente, asegurando la construcción de una sociedad de bienestar y la realización de la modernización socialista en China”<sup>35</sup>. Desde esta perspectiva, la economía de mercado no es más que un mecanismo usado por el gobierno para lograr las metas socialistas y el cual puede ser restringido por éste, en el caso de que falle en conseguirlas. Es así como,

(8) Ver artículo 145 de la Constitución de la Republica Popular China

desde la óptica oficial, en el modelo chino, el mercado no constituye un sistema económico separado, es solo un mecanismo que combinado con otras formas más directas de regulación y control, se despliega a fin de lograr las metas socialistas.

Así pues, el contraste de los principios de la economía de mercado con los de las economías socialistas<sup>36</sup>, sugieren que el socialismo chino es un modelo plagado de contradicciones, entre las que destaca el hecho de que bajo este modelo el control de los medios de producción descansa en gran parte bajo el régimen de propiedad privada, a la vez que es éste sector el principal determinante del crecimiento económico del país; a pesar de que la superioridad del socialismo descansa en la propiedad pública de los medios de producción. Por otra parte, la permanencia de una economía mercantil y monetaria determinada por la ley del valor, la persistencia de relaciones de producción antagónicas, la explotación del hombre por el hombre en virtud de las largas y subpagadas jornadas de trabajo, la socialización efectiva de la producción y la forma privada de su apropiación, el crecimiento económico como un objetivo permanente, el fortalecimiento del Estado y la pérdida del carácter proletario del PCCH, son solo algunas de las principales contradicciones de las que adolece el socialismo chino.

#### *IV. La Restauración Capitalista en China y su Carácter Burocrático*

La Revolución China – una revolución democrática nacional, como la planteó Mao en sus inicios- sin duda alguna, persiguió objetivos categóricamente socialistas, y pese a los bemoles de este proceso, sus logros sociales y políticos fueron bastante significativos. El partido, con una estructura marxista-leninista y con una amplia base popular, transformó los cimientos de la sociedad semicolonial, a un Estado que tomó como punto de partida, la abolición de la propiedad privada de los medios de producción, principalmente a través de la expropiación de tierras a las clases propietarias.

No obstante, con el devenir del tiempo, esta situación originó una separación de hecho de las clases trabajadoras con respecto a los medios de producción y distribución, toda vez, que la “propiedad social”, fuera desde ese entonces controlada por una burocracia estatal inmensa y poderosa, que además carecía de control popular y democrático alguno. Es así, como el nuevo Estado, vendría a reproducir en su seno la condición de clases expropiadas de las clases trabajadoras, salvo la diferencia de que ahora eran portadoras de amplios beneficios. Sin embargo, la estructura de las relaciones sociales de producción no cambió sustancialmente. “El aparato político que se utilizó para destruir las antiguas desigualdades había dado lugar a un nuevo conjunto de desigualdades. El poder del Estado se suponía que se utilizaba para favorecer los intereses de los trabajadores, claro está. Sin embargo, en realidad, las clases trabajadoras subordinadas eran, en el mejor de los casos dependientes de una burocracia paternalista”<sup>37</sup>.

Max Weber ha sostenido que: “la burocracia es el medio de transformar la “acción comunitaria” en una “acción societal” organizada racionalmente. Por esto, la burocracia como instrumento de “societalización” de las relaciones de poder, ha sido y es un instrumento de gran importancia para quien controle el aparato burocrático”<sup>38</sup>. En efecto, la burocracia ha sido en China el engranaje principal que permite articular el ejercicio

del poder en ese mecanismo trípode de partido, Estado y gobierno. Paradójicamente, el fuerte burocratismo y la centralización del poder son entre otras cosas, elementos que han coadyuvado a la perdurabilidad del control social del PCCH por más de 63 años. Sin embargo, este fuerte burocratismo es a su vez, una de las grandes debilidades del sistema.

La Revolución Cultural, puso en evidencia dicha situación. Ésta además de considerarse como un movimiento que buscaba promover la conciencia revolucionaria, evidenció no solo una cruenta disputa por el poder y la escisión del partido en dos facciones, sino que además significó una lucha contra todas las formas de autoridad burocrática. Es por ello, que se sostiene que a pesar de la extrema vigilancia que tenía Mao sobre las tendencias regresivas, éste fracasó en el control de la estructura de dominio de clase formada durante el Estado posrevolucionario. De acuerdo con ello, el maoísmo se centró más atacando a los burócratas de la facción revisionista, sus privilegios y filiaciones ideológicas, que al sistema de dominio burocrático en sí. Los despliegues de jóvenes activistas que las propias líneas de la Revolución habían propiciado, fueron reprimidos, desmovilizados y acompañados de las purgas de la ultraizquierda. “Al devorar a sus propios hijos rebeldes, el maoísmo agotó rápidamente su energía política y acabo siendo incapaz de trascender sus limitaciones históricas esenciales mediante la transformación fundamental del poder estatal”<sup>39</sup>, construyéndose así la principal contradicción en la que incurrió Mao durante la Revolución Cultural “(...) él era el “cuadro principal” del régimen burocrático por él personalizado y, a la vez, su “principal rebelde”<sup>40</sup>. En virtud de ello, la Revolución Cultural logró mitigar algo del elitismo burocrático, empero, la distinción entre la elite política y las clases populares como clase subordinada permaneció intacta. En suma, continuaba la enajenación política del Estado y la separación de las clases trabajadoras de los medios de producción, que seguían bajo el control de la burocracia partidista-estatal.

A raíz de esto, se erige la tesis de la restauración del capitalismo en China. Según ésta, durante la Revolución Cultural una facción del partido proclive a las ideas capitalistas, consigue revertir los logros de la Revolución e impone la vía capitalista por decreto gubernamental. Así pues, el proceso de restauración parte desde la aceptación de las ideas burguesas por una camarilla de líderes, que usurpan la dirección del partido y emprenden la transformación del carácter de clase del poder del Estado, a los fines de acabar con la economía socialista y crear una nueva clase dominante y explotadora<sup>41</sup>. Ahora bien, más que considerar que la vuelta al capitalismo, fuera del todo una imposición decretada, consideramos que fueron las contradicciones tanto generadas por el socialismo, como las heredadas de la etapa del capitalismo nacionalista, las que fraguaron la restauración capitalista en este país.

Y es que paradójicamente, fue en el socialismo donde se engendraron los componentes esenciales de su transformación al capitalismo. Iniciando en la etapa de prerreformas, donde se implementa una nueva manera de organización del trabajo en el campo, que aunada al carácter fragmentado de la economía china, logra atenuar la rigidez del sistema de planificación central, conllevando a la aparición de iniciativas privadas. Además de ello, se le atribuye al periodo maoísta el fundar los cimientos que conllevarían al milagro económico chino de los años ochenta, debido a su contribución en la construcción del capital nacional y el mejoramiento de las capacidades técnicas que sentaron las bases para la acumulación de capital –como ya sabemos- condición *sine qua non* del modo de producción capitalista. Cabe considerar por otra parte, que

los costes políticos, económicos y humanitarios que trajo la puesta en práctica del GSA, le sirvieron de plataforma ideológica y material al ala revisionista, para fundar una nueva teoría económica, al contraste de los errores cometidos en la era maoísta. Eso sí, sin abandonar sus pilares ideológicos, los cuales eran esenciales para que los nuevos líderes lograran legitimarse.

La Política de Reajuste Económico desde el año 1978 a 1981, permitió que se sentaran las bases para la restauración capitalista, en tanto y cuanto, la posterior supresión de las comunas agrícolas, dio lugar a la disociación del campesinado de los medios de producción y estos se vieron en la obligación de vender su fuerza de trabajo. En suma, este contingente de personas se convirtió en un gigantesco ejército de reserva que se utilizó en primera instancia para proveer de mano de obra a las ZEE, y durante los años noventa al resto de China. Sobre este particular, vale destacar, que el desmantelamiento de las comunas rurales sirvió como punto de partida para agudizar el sistema de explotación del hombre por el hombre, y la cada vez más acentuada diferenciación entre una clase propietaria de los medios de producción y otra clase desposeída de ellos.

Desde el punto de vista del sistema empresarial, también encontramos cambios en su régimen que contribuyeron a la restauración capitalista. La aparición de las ECPV permitió que se diera origen a un proceso de acumulación de capital en las aldeas a la par del surgimiento de una burguesía que en congruencia con las autoridades locales explotaba a las ECPV. Y aunque formalmente se supone que esta es una forma de propiedad colectiva, en la realidad se sostiene que estas empresas se han convertido en negocios privados que funcionan bajo el esquema de sociedad de accionistas o cooperativas.

Por lo demás, la existencia de una burguesía china en ultramar, también ha jugado un papel importante en la restauración capitalista. Como es sabido, luego del triunfo de la Revolución, el partido burgués del Kuomintang y sus cuadros se exilian en Taiwán y en la antes colonia británica de Hong Kong. Esta situación permitió que de alguna manera, esta clase burguesa siguiera teniendo cohesión social y que además se desarrollara como uno de los principales inversores de Asia. De allí que, sus vínculos familiares, conexiones y riqueza, les hayan permitido seguir teniendo un papel importante dentro de China como una “clase capitalista de reserva”<sup>42</sup>. Quizá, una de las cosas más importantes de esto, lo sea el hecho de que el éxito de las ZEE, cercanas a Taiwán y Hong Kong, tuvieron un auge impresionante gracias a la oleada de capital extranjero proveniente de esta clase a través de su participación en las Joint – Ventures. Es así como, para finales de los noventa los capitalistas de Hong Kong, empleaban a casi tres millones de trabajadores de la China continental, con salarios que oscilaban entre los 3 y 4 dólares por día<sup>43</sup>. Finalmente, lo que más llama la atención de esto, es que gran parte de la inversión que proviene del extranjero, son fondos fugados de los burócratas del PCCH, que a través de sociedades ficticias buscan obtener los beneficios que implican las concesiones a las empresas extranjeras, como la evasión de impuestos entre otros.

A la postre, la ideología clásica con la que se funda el partido y se consolida durante la década de los cincuenta y de los sesenta, ha debido ser reinterpretada y por qué no, ajustada a los tiempos modernos y a los resultados de la reforma. Con sumo cuidado, han sido redefinidas por los dirigentes chinos las ideas del comunismo clásico so pena de ser acusados de capitalistas y liberales dado el viraje que la sociedad ha dado hacia la economía de mercado. El partido se ha adaptado y en consecuencia transformado ideológicamente,

a los fines de seguir manteniendo el control, liderazgo y jerarquía, en una sociedad cada vez más plagada por las instituciones de mercado. Desde el marxismo-leninismo, al pensamiento de Mao Tse-Tung, a la Teoría de Deng Xiaoping, a la Teoría de las Tres Representaciones y al Concepto Científico de Desarrollo, los dirigentes chinos han reinventado el comunismo tradicional y la estructura del partido, acogiendo en su seno nuevas clases sociales y superando el dilema de “Rojo y Experto”, para mantenerse en el poder y legitimar sus acciones.

A la par de este proceso, se han ido fortaleciendo las estructuras de carácter burocrático y una clase que usando su poder político y su influencia, ha asegurado la consecución de sus intereses económicos y el manejo de sectores estratégicos de la economía. En definitiva, estamos en presencia, de una clase dirigente, que usando su poder político, se posiciona dentro de la elite económica, y ejerce la dominación. En un doble sentido, el modelo es capitalista y a su vez está burocratizado. Lo primero, porque prevalece la disociación efectiva del hombre de los medios de producción, haciendo que las fuentes de capital y su distribución se encuentren enajenadas por el partido, el Estado y lo privado. Lo segundo, porque las distintas formas de control de los medios de producción se encuentran encabezadas por un aparato burocratizado y compuesto por una clase dirigente de personas que siendo cuadros del partido o estando vinculado a éste a través de las relaciones clientelares, se hacen del dominio de la estructura económica.

## V. CONCLUSIONES

Un análisis político, económico y social de la China del siglo XXI, nos lleva a afirmar con bastante certeza que su modelo de economía socialista de mercado reviste un carácter esencialmente contradictorio. En este sentido, el socialismo con características chinas, se erige sobre la base de las contradicciones heredadas del capitalismo nacionalista, así como de las mismas contradicciones surgidas en el seno del socialismo chino, tanto de la era maoísta como de la reformista. La separación de hecho de las clases trabajadoras de los medios de producción, que quedaron a cargo de una burocracia estatal y partidista sin control democrático alguno, constituye el fundamento del proceso de regresión o restauración del capitalismo en este país.

El punto de inflexión, lo hallamos en la adhesión de China a la OMC. Este hecho constituye la apertura definitiva de este país hacia el mundo y el establecimiento de relaciones comerciales basadas en los parámetros del libre mercado. Con ello, China se inserta en el sistema capitalista mundial contemporáneo, a la vez que evidencia la máxima expresión de la restauración capitalista en ese país.

De allí, que el estudio de la realidad china nos conduzca a afirmar que el modelo de economía socialista de mercado, se presenta como un eufemismo del capitalismo. Un capitalismo *sui generis* o con características chinas, dado que entraña un carácter híbrido al poseer elementos de planificación, economía de mercado y un fuerte burocratismo, que coexisten con una sociedad y un partido que se autodefinen como comunista. La clave de dicha coexistencia, se encuentra en la forma cómo lo político y sus instituciones se han reinventado, ante la adopción premeditada de la vía capitalista. Empero, los costos de dicha transformación han sido altos, y lo que por una parte ha conducido al éxito del modelo, por la otra, se constituye como su principal

debilidad.

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## Más allá de la lengua: Estudiantes chinos en España

Joaquín Beltrán Antolín

Los primeros libros publicados en Filipinas el año 1593, el *Beng Sim Po Cham* [*Ming xin shi jian*, Espejo rico del claro corazón], bilingüe chino-español, *Doctrina Christiana, en lengua española y tagala*; y *Doctrina Christiana, en letra y lengua china*, fueron impresos en sistema xilográfico por Juan de Vera Ken Yong, chino cristiano. La lengua española, tagala y china quedaron grabadas en papel en la colonia española gracias a la maestría de un impresor de origen chino. El conocimiento de la lengua, necesario para poder llevar a cabo esta empresa, no era un fin en sí mismo, sino un instrumento para alcanzar un objetivo, en este caso, por ejemplo, ayudar a la evangelización. El aprendizaje y el dominio del español por parte de personas chinas fue una tarea importante especialmente a partir del establecimiento de los españoles en Filipinas. Primero los comerciantes y poco después todo tipo de artesanos y trabajadores chinos llegados a Manila para colaborar en la construcción y desarrollo de la ciudad, aprendieron español para comunicarse y alcanzar su supervivencia y/o prosperidad. El conocimiento de la lengua facilitaba la mediación en aquel contexto colonial con consecuencias en la mejora de las posibilidades de movilidad social. Posteriormente, a los *compradores* –agentes comerciales o intermediarios– españoles en China durante el siglo XIX, que en su mayoría eran chino-filipinos, el dominio de la lengua española les ofrecía oportunidades de negocio inalcanzables de otro modo. El comerciante políglota no necesitaba de intermediarios –traductores– para comunicarse, accediendo directamente a negocios vetados a los monolingües.

En el siglo XX, surge una necesidad nueva de aprender español por parte de las personas chinas. El ámbito diplomático necesitaba a conocedores de las lenguas de los países con los que mantenía relaciones y dónde se abrían embajadas –en Madrid y en La Habana, junto al consulado en Matanzas, se establecieron el año 1878–, a lo cual se suma, por un lado, la gran empresa de traducción de obras extranjeras en China durante el movimiento de la Nueva Cultura (1915-1925), cuando por primera vez se traducen clásicos españoles, y por otro, la llegada posterior a España de intelectuales, estudiantes y artistas chinos. China, desde finales del siglo XIX envió a muchos estudiantes al extranjero para aprender todo tipo de conocimientos “occidentales” con el objetivo de aplicarlos después en su país. No obstante, España en aquella época había perdido su poder colonial y no era la vanguardia del conocimiento del momento. Los estudiantes chinos preferían ir a Japón, Estados Unidos, Reino Unido, Francia, Alemania, Bélgica, entre otros países. Los jesuitas españoles abrieron en la provincia de Anhui una universidad católica en 1949, el mismo año en que se fundó la República Popular, por lo que pronto se trasladó a Taiwán. A pesar de no establecer relaciones diplomáticas hasta el año 1973, en China no se olvidaron de la lengua española. Institucionalizó su enseñanza en la educación superior, en concreto en el Instituto de Lenguas Extranjeras de Beijing en 1952, y también colaboraron españoles procedentes de la Unión Soviética –María Lecea y Ataulfo Melendo, por ejemplo, enseñaron español allí de 1955 a 1964–, así como latinoamericanos, especialmente de Cuba (Melendo, 2010; Fisac, 2000).

La puesta en marcha de intercambios culturales entre los dos países fue testigo de la llegada de los primeros estudiantes procedentes de la República Popular en la década de 1970, aunque España continuó siendo



un destino académico secundario para los estudiantes chinos durante mucho tiempo, prefiriendo desplazarse a países de habla inglesa -Estados Unidos, Canadá, Australia, Nueva Zelanda-, o a Japón, Alemania y Francia. La lengua no ha sido, ni mucho menos, el principal objetivo de sus estudios en el extranjero, más bien cualquier ámbito del conocimiento científico, desde ingenierías y ciencias puras a ciencias sociales y humanidades.

A partir del cambio de agenda de desarrollo chino a finales de los años setenta del siglo pasado, la fiebre por salir a estudiar al extranjero multiplicó exponencialmente la presencia de estudiantes chinos en los países antes mencionados. El entusiasmo por aprender inglés en China es un hecho desde la década de 1980, mientras que el español ha continuado siendo una opción secundaria hasta hace relativamente poco tiempo. Desde comienzos del nuevo siglo, el interés por el dominio del español ha escalado progresivamente posiciones en las preferencias chinas, una vez que el conocimiento del inglés se ha difundido tanto que ya no es una marca de distinción como antes: los perfiles competitivos en el ámbito laboral chino valoran el dominio de otras lenguas, además del inglés. Paralelamente se ha desarrollado otro fenómeno que consiste en el creciente aumento de la demanda de formación en el extranjero para acceder a una mejor escala salarial en el país, junto al aumento de una clase media con mayor disponibilidad económica que invierte en la educación de sus hijos enviándolos al extranjero. España, aunque continúa en un segundo plano en comparación a otros países, finalmente ha comenzado a ser considerada, entre otras cosas, por ofrecer una educación pública de calidad y relativamente más barata que otros países. Este cambio de posición de España se observa en la evolución de las cifras de sus estudiantes en el país, que han pasado de 104 en el año 1992 a 240 en 2000 para alcanzar 4.719 en 2012. Los estudiantes chinos que vienen a estudiar exclusivamente lengua española actualmente son una minoría, lo cual no significa que no deban estudiarla para tener éxito en sus estudios. Pero también hay que tener en cuenta que en España se ofrecen cada vez más estudios de posgrado –máster- y doctorado en inglés, con el fin de atraer a un perfil de estudiante internacional que no necesita dominar el español para estudiar en España. De hecho, en estudios de grado en universidades españolas comienzan a impartirse asignaturas, e incluso itinerarios completos, en inglés. Por ejemplo, la Generalitat de Cataluña se ha propuesto como objetivo que en futuro próximo que el 10% de la docencia de los grados oficiales se imparta en inglés. Y así, paradójicamente, mientras China demanda cada vez más estudiar en español, la universidad española ofrece cada vez más enseñanza en inglés.

La evolución de las características de la demanda de los estudiantes procedentes de Asia en la enseñanza universitaria española ha sido analizada en Beltrán y Sáiz (2003), Altafaja (2007) y Wen Dong (2011). El año 1999 los estudiantes taiwaneses (169) fueron superados por primera vez por los de la República Popular China (209) y desde entonces su número no ha cesado de aumentar, hasta el punto que en el año 2005 China cuenta con el mayor grupo de estudiantes asiáticos en España, dejando en segunda posición a los japoneses que tradicionalmente ocupaban el primer lugar y, de acuerdo a las últimas estadísticas oficiales publicadas por la Secretaría General de Inmigración y Emigración, el 31 de marzo de 2012 había 4.719 chinos con Autorización de Estancia por Estudios en Vigor, junto a 410 procedentes de Taiwan. Los estudiantes chinos actualmente se encuentran en la cuarta posición de todos los estudiantes extranjeros en España y sólo son sobrepasados por los procedentes de Estados Unidos, Colombia y México. La Comunidad de Madrid concentra el mayor volumen, seguida por Cataluña, Castilla-León y Andalucía.

Igual que Juan de Vera Ken Yong a finales del siglo XVI sabía español y aplicaba sus conocimientos en una determinada profesión –impresor–, los estudiantes chinos se encuentran realizando todo tipo de estudios que van más allá de la lengua: arquitectura, turismo, administración de empresas, económicas, ciencias políticas, historia, etc. La lengua es un instrumento imprescindible para su aprendizaje en la mayoría de los casos, pero ha dejado de ser un fin en sí misma. Si en un principio la mayor parte de los estudiantes eran de filología española o del servicio diplomático, ahora estas especialidades son minoritarias y poco a poco España ha dejado de ser una opción secundaria académica y se está convirtiendo en un destino deseado dado el reconocimiento de la calidad de su enseñanza.

Algunos países han desarrollado programas específicos destinados a estudiantes chinos ofreciendo todo tipo de becas y facilidades, como por ejemplo Estados Unidos, Canadá, Australia, etc. que compiten en el mercado internacional de la enseñanza para atraerlos por los beneficios económicos directos que conllevan sus estudios –matrículas, gastos de vida, turismo, etc.–, y por los indirectos a los que se accede cuando una vez finalizados se integran en la estructura económica nacional, bien como mano de obra cualificada, o bien como emprendedores e innovadores que abren empresas de todo tipo, incluidas las de elevado valor añadido, para lo cual también se han elaborado programas específicos de transición y apoyo junto a la gestión de una política de visados flexible. En Estados Unidos se han realizado investigaciones que demuestran que cuantos más asiáticos llegan al país, más se exporta a Asia y el motivo es que los asiáticos plurilingües y multiculturales tienen más facilidad para desarrollar negocios de exportación que los estadounidenses monolingües y monoculturales (Light et al., 2002; Beltrán y Sáiz, 2009); otro ejemplo de cómo la llegada de estudiantes chinos y su posterior integración en la economía una vez graduados, se materializa en creación de riqueza para el país, es que un tercio de los ingenieros de Silicon Valley son de origen chino o taiwanés. Canadá cuenta en la actualidad con los chinos como primera minoría nacional (un total de 1,3 millones de personas) de origen inmigrante no anglófono ni francófono.

España todavía tiene por delante un importante desafío para competir con destinos preferentes de los estudiantes chinos en Europa, donde por ejemplo el Reino Unido cuenta con 80.000. En definitiva, para China estudiar en España resulta cada vez más atractivo por todos los motivos mencionados anteriormente. Los intentos realizados por las universidades españolas para atraer a futuros estudiantes procedentes de China cada vez tienen más éxito. Durante los últimos años se ha demostrado que lejos de venir a España con la intención de quedarse, en su gran mayoría lo hacen para conseguir un título y una experiencia internacional que, además de abrirles nuevos campos en su futuro profesional, en el momento de su vuelta a China les compensa por la expectativa de obtener mejores salarios frente a los que no han estudiado en el extranjero. España puede aprovechar esta coyuntura para mejorar su economía y competitividad en el mercado internacional de la educación superior especialmente en épocas de crisis como la actual.

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# 解析中国

## Jiexi Zhongguo



伊比利亚美洲 对中国的分析与思考  
Análisis y Pensamiento Iberoamericano sobre China

中国

Observatorio de la  
Política China